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TRANS-BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL RELOCATION
IN CHINA
Hao Feng, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2018
This dissertation studies trans-boundary air pollution under China’s regionally decentralized
environmental management and its influences on non-polluting industries. It consists of three
chapters.
In the first chapter, I study whether subnational governments in China have engaged
in trans-boundary air pollution. I identify which cities are “downwind” in each of Chi-
na’s provinces and uses difference-in-differences estimations based on wind patterns and a
large-scale policy-change. I find that China’s provincial governments began locating highly
polluting industries in downwind cities near provincial borders after 2003 when the central
government introduced stricter environmental policies. These results partly explain why
environmental pollution has not been mitigated in certain parts of China.
In the second chapter, I build a model to analyze the effects of policy-induced trans-
boundary air pollution on non-polluting industries in China. The patterns of industrial
relocation caused by trans-boundary air pollution are characterized in the model. When
the central government increases the weight of pollution in its evaluation function, there are
more output and employment of polluting industry in the downwind city in each province,
which implies more trans-boundary air pollution. This will lead to relatively less output and
employment of non-polluting industry in the upwind city, and total welfare of the economy
is less than the social planner’s solution.
In the third chapter, I empirically estimate the negative externalities of trans-boundary
air pollution on non-polluting industries in China. Through a quasi-experimental approach
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combining regional wind patterns and a large-scale policy-change in the early 2000s, I find
that output and employment of existing firms in non-polluting industries are relatively less
in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution from their upwind adjacent provinces. The
negative effects are relatively greater for firms of non-polluting industries in cities with higher
average wind speed. New firms of non-polluting industries are less likely to be located in
cities receiving more trans-boundary air pollution after the policy change.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Trans-boundary spillover is a major issue for pollution control under decentralized environ-
mental management. However, studies on trans-boundary air pollution are limited, as it is
difficult to define “downwind” places clearly without detailed information of wind patterns.
This dissertation studies trans-boundary air pollution under China’s regionally decentralized
environmental management through a quasi-experimental approach based on regional wind
patterns and a large-scale policy-change. This dissertation consists of three chapters.
The first chapter contributes to the literature on the negative externalities of trans-
boundary environmental pollution. One of the major contributions of this study is to iden-
tify clearly which cities are “downwind” in each of China’s provinces by exploring a recently
available dataset of wind patterns. The quasi-experimental approach of this study is also
based on a large-scale policy-change. The central government began to introduce stricter
environmental regulation in the early 2000s when a long history of using coal as the main
energy source had caused severe air pollution in China. However, since subnational govern-
ments in China have regionally decentralized economic and environmental management, and
subnational leaders are competing for promotion under centrally controlled political gover-
nance, they have stronger incentives to dump more air pollution on provincial borders after
the policy change. Through difference-in-differences estimations on China’s 286 major cities,
I find that China’s provincial governments began locating more highly polluting industries in
downwind cities near provincial borders than in all other types of cities after 2003 when the
central government introduced stricter environmental policies. These results provide clear
evidence for the negative externalities of trans-boundary air pollution and partly explain
why environmental pollution has not been mitigated in certain parts of China.
The second chapter is a straightforward extension of the previous one. I begin to in-
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vestigate the consequences of policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution across China’s
provinces. Particularly, my research question is how pollution from one province affects
output, the number of firms, and employment in non-polluting industries in its neighbor-
ing provinces. In this chapter, I build a model to analyze the effects of trans-boundary
air pollution on non-polluting industries in China. Nash equilibrium of provincial leaders’
strategic response is solved for this model, and patterns of industrial relocation caused by
trans-boundary air pollution are characterized by comparative statics of the equilibrium out-
comes. When labor markets are connected within each province, if the central government
increases the weight of pollution in its evaluation function, there are more output and em-
ployment of polluting industry in the downwind cities, which implies more trans-boundary
air pollution. This will lead to relatively less output and employment of non-polluting in-
dustry in the upwind cities, and total welfare of the economy is less than the social planner’s
solution. The predictions from the model are used to guide empirical estimations in the next
chapter.
In the third chapter, I empirically study whether non-polluting industries in downwind
provinces are affected by increased trans-boundary air pollution due to policy change. The
empirical estimations are guided by comparative statics of the model in the previous chapter,
and econometric specification is also based on a quasi-experimental approach combining
policy-change and regional wind patterns. I figure out which cities are most likely to be
affected by trans-boundary air pollution from their neighboring provinces. Difference-in-
differences estimations show that trans-boundary air pollution under China’s decentralized
environmental management has significantly negative effects on non-polluting industries in
cities near provincial borders. The output and employment of existing firms in non-polluting
industries are relatively less in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution from their upwind
adjacent provinces. The negative effects are relatively larger for clean industries in cities with
higher average wind speed. State-owned firms of the clean industries in the receiver cities
have more unproductive employment. New firms in clean industries are less likely to be
located in the receiver cities. The findings have important contributions to the literature
that assesses the economic cost of pollution through estimating the impacts on output and
employment of industrial sectors.
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2.0 TRANS-BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION AND REGIONAL
DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Trans-boundary externalities of environmental pollution prove to be major issues when de-
signing and implementing public policies for pollution control. Owing to asymmetric patterns
of wind direction, places located downwind suffer more trans-boundary air pollution, gener-
ating public concerns in many countries. In the United States, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) set Cross-State Air Pollution Rule in 2011, which requires 28 states to reduce
trans-boundary air pollution emissions, and the Supreme Court has ruled against electric
utilities that opposed this regulation in 2014 (Kendall and Sweet, 2014). In other coun-
tries, like China, where air pollution is managed in a decentralized way by provincial and
local governments, trans-boundary negative spillover may be more significant. In this chap-
ter, I empirically study trans-boundary air pollution under China’s decentralized economic
and environmental governance. The main question is whether inefficiencies associated with
trans-boundary air pollution have increased after the incentives of local officials changed as
a result of a large-scale policy-change of the central government.
While decentralization is good for allowing policies to vary more with the heterogeneity
of local preferences and it may induce fewer problems of incomplete information, decentral-
ized environmental management may prove to be costly if a “race to the bottom” in stan-
dards of environmental quality occurs when local governments compete for new investment
(Cumberland, 1981), or if local governments free ride for trans-boundary negative external-
ities of pollution (Oates, 1999, 2002). The latter concern of trans-boundary pollution has
been considered as a more serious problem when environmental damage is capitalized into
3
local property values (Oates, 1999). There is empirical evidence in the literature for trans-
boundary river pollution, showing that polluting activities are generally more significant
near downstream jurisdictional borders when environmental management is decentralized
(Sigman, 2002, 2005; Helland and Whitford, 2003; Cai et al., 2016; Lipscomb and Mobarak,
2016). However, studies on trans-boundary air pollution are limited, as it is difficult to define
“downwind” places clearly without detailed information of wind patterns.
Since wind patterns are crucial for determining the geographical distribution of air-
polluting industries, one of the most important contributions of the present research is to
define clearly which cities are “downwind” in China’s provinces by exploring a dataset of
wind patterns from WINDFINDER (2014). This dataset includes dominant wind direction
(◦) and average wind speed (km/h) over 12 months for each province. Using these data,
I calculate the all-time average dominant wind direction in each province, and then define
which cities are “downwind” based on this direction. I also measure the intensity of wind
by the average wind speed, and measure the stability of wind direction by the standard de-
viation of wind direction in each province. The details about this dataset and how to define
“downwind” cities are discussed in Section 2.2.1. Combining the data of wind patterns and
geographical distribution of air-polluting industries, I estimate whether air polluting activi-
ties have become more significant in downwind cities near provincial borders after the policy
changes of the central government, through difference-in-differences (DID) estimations. I
also conduct triple-differences (DDD) estimations in order to analyze whether the effects of
trans-boundary air pollution are more significant in places with higher wind speed or with
more stable wind direction after the reforms.
This empirical strategy is based on changes to environmental policies made by China’s
central government in the early 2000s, which have largely affected the incentives of subna-
tional political leaders under China’s political system. China’s current political system is a
combination of centrally controlled political governance and decentralized economic gover-
nance (Landry, 2008; Xu, 2011). Subnational governments have overall right and responsi-
bilities in local economic and social governance, including environmental management, while
local leaders are appointed from above in a centralized cadre management system. They
are motivated to focus on local outcomes in order to satisfy standard and rules set by the
4
central government, and they compete with each other for promotion (Qian et al., 1999; Li
and Zhou, 2005). Hence, this political system creates localized incentives for local leaders
to free ride on the externalities influencing their neighboring areas. When the central gov-
ernment changed environmental policies in the early 2000s, environmental outcomes became
more important for the objectives of local governments, and subnational leaders were given
stronger incentives to free ride on trans-boundary environmental pollution.
Reforms of environmental policies were launched by the central government, in order to
fight against severe air pollution in China. The annual average ambient concentration of
total suspended particles in China’s major cities from 1981 to 2001 was more than double
the national standard of 200µg/m3 (Bi et al., 2007), which was itself five times of the level
in the United States before the Clean Air Act in 1970 (Chen et al., 2013). The degree of
air pollution in modern China is similar to the heavy pollution during the historical period
of industrialization in developed countries (Rawski, 2009). Severe air pollution in modern
China is highly correlated with the use of coal as the main source of energy. For more than
20 years, China has been the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal. In 2015, total
production of coal in China was 3.747 billion metric tonnes (47.7% of total global production),
and total consumption of coal in China was 3.939 billion metric tonnes (50.0% of total global
consumption). Figure 1 shows the production and consumption of coal in China from 1981 to
20151. Severe air pollution has caused huge welfare losses in China. The health losses from air
pollution in China are 3.8% of GDP, while the total costs of water and air pollution are 5.8%
of GDP according to a survey by World Bank (2007). In order to deal with the environmental
crisis, the central government has made major changes to environmental policies since the
early 2000s. The new regime of environmental policies includes targets to reduce pollution
emissions, stricter laws on monitoring and punishing pollution, and changes to the criteria
of evaluating local officials’ performances. However, environmental pollution has not been
alleviated significantly in China after this policy-change in environmental management. As
shown in Figure 1, coal production and consumption continued to grow rapidly during the
period from 2001 to 2013. In contrast to the target to reduce total emissions of sulfur dioxide
(SO2) by 10% in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), the actual level of SO2 emissions
1Data source: “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016,” (British Petroleum, 2016).
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increased by 27% during the 5-year period (Cai et al., 2016). The free-riding behavior of local
governments for trans-boundary spillover may partly explain the reason that environmental
quality is not improving significantly after the regime shift in environmental management.
Hence, studies on trans-boundary air pollution may have important policy implications for
China’s decentralized economic and environmental governance.
In this study, I empirically test the level of trans-boundary air pollution in China through
a treatment effects approach, which is based on changes to incentives faced by provincial and
local officials after the central government has reformed environmental policies in the early
2000s, as well as patterns of average wind speed and stability of wind direction. According
to the definition of “polluting industries” in the Report on the First National Census of
Polluting Sources (MEP, 2010), I use firm level data from the Annual Survey of Above-
Scale Industrial Firms (National Bureau of Statistics, 1998–2007) to calculate the aggregate
outputs in polluting industries of four major air pollutants (SO2, NO2, dust, and soot) for 286
major cities in China during the period of 1998–2007. These variables are used as measures
for intensity of air-polluting activities at city level. From the DID estimations for cities near
a provincial border (a distance less than 100 km), I find that outputs of polluting industries
for pollutants SO2, NO2, and soot are relatively higher in downwind cities after 2003. The
DDD estimations further show that the effects of trans-boundary air pollution are stronger in
downwind cities with higher average wind speed, and such effects are stronger in downwind
cities with more stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of wind direction). These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that provincial and local governments free ride
more on trans-boundary air pollution after the central government reformed environmental
policies. Due to this kind of negative trans-boundary externality of environmental pollution,
further reforms in political institutions and current decentralized environmental management
system are necessary to mitigate air pollution in China effectively.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature,
and introduces the wind patterns and institutions that shape the research design. Section 2.3
reports the data and econometric specifications. Section 2.4 presents the baseline empirical
results. Section 2.5 reports the results of the robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes.
Section 2.7 includes the figures and tables.
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2.2 WIND PATTERNS, INSTITUTIONS, AND TRANS-BOUNDARY
POLLUTION
2.2.1 Wind Patterns and Downwind Cities in China’s Provinces
The regime shift in environmental management in the early 2000s provides a chance to s-
tudy trans-boundary air pollution in China empirically using a difference-in-difference (DID)
approach. The incentives faced by local governments have changed since the policy-change,
and the localized environmental outcomes have become much more important to local lead-
ers. They are more likely to take advantage of trans-boundary externalities of environmen-
tal pollution after the reforms. If the provincial and local governments free ride more on
trans-boundary negative externalities, they will relocate air-polluting industries to down-
wind regions near provincial borders. Since it is difficult to define downwind cities without
detailed information about wind patterns in each province, trans-boundary air pollution has
not been well studied in previous literature. One of the most important contributions of this
study is to define downwind cities clearly in each province according to a recently available
dataset of wind patterns. Based on this, I conduct estimations according to dominant wind
direction, average wind speed, as well as standard deviation of wind direction.
The provincial data of wind patterns are obtained from WINDFINDER (2014), which
provides worldwide wind and weather information, including data of monthly wind patterns
in China’s 30 provinces2. This is an important meteorological dataset currently open to the
public for studies on wind in China. It includes dominant wind direction (◦) and average
wind speed (km/h) over 12 months, showing seasonal changes of wind patterns in each
province. Therefore, I can calculate an all-time average dominant wind direction, an average
wind speed, and a standard deviation of wind direction for each province according to the
dataset. Figure 2 shows the all-time average dominant wind direction for each province
of China, and Table 1 presents the summary statistics of wind patterns in each province.
“Downwind” cities in each province are defined according to the figure. Here, I take Henan
Province, the most populous province in China, as one example of how to define downwind
2Mainland China has 31 provinces (including 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities), and this dataset
covers all provinces except Tibet Autonomous Region.
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cities. Figure 3 shows the location of major cities in Henan Province. The average dominant
wind direction is 95.3◦ in this province, which is close to the direction of east. The following
cities are defined as downwind cities: Anyang, Hebi, Jiaozuo, Nanyang, Sanmenxia, and
Xinyang. Downwind cities in all other provinces are defined in the same way. In addition, I
measure wind intensity by average wind speed, and I measure the stability of wind direction
by standard deviation of wind direction in each province.
China’s wind patterns, including average wind speed and stability of wind direction
(measured by standard deviation of wind direction), are comparable to other big countries
with large population size (e.g. the United States, India, and Brazil). There is quite large
variation in both wind speed and stability of wind direction, across different regions in
China. Therefore, China is a good example for studying trans-boundary air pollution using
a quasi-experimental approach based on wind patterns.
2.2.2 Institutions: Decentralization, Changes of Environmental Policy, and In-
centives of Local Officials in China
The empirical strategy in this chapter is motivated by some important features of the funda-
mental institutions of China’s political economy, which shape the incentives of local govern-
ments when they are faced with changes of the central government’s environmental policies.
In this subsection, I briefly introduce background facts about institutions, beginning with
China’s regional decentralization.
China’s political system since the reforms starting in 1978 has been characterized as a
regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime3 by some scholars. This regime is a
combination of centrally controlled political governance and decentralized economic gover-
nance (Landry, 2008; Xu, 2011); while local leaders are appointed from above in a centralized
cadre management system, the governance of national economy is delegated to subnational
governments, and subnational governments have overall responsibility for developing local
economic policies, providing public services, and designing and enforcing laws Xu (2011).
3The term RDA regime is suggested by Xu (2011) to characterize the political system in modern China
for interpreting the political economy of China’s rapid economic growth in recent decades, which is different
from both federalism under democracy and a centrally-planned economy.
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Currently, there are five vertical hierarchies in China’s governance structure: the nation,
province, prefecture, county and township. The governments at hierarchies from province
to township are generally called local (subnational) governments, and the governments at
provincial and prefectural levels are the most powerful in developing local economic policies
and implementing environmental regulation. In China’s political system, local governments
are motivated to fulfill the targets and tasks set by the upper-level government, and “yard-
stick competition” takes place among provincial and local governments for political promo-
tion (Qian et al., 1999). In 1980s and 1990s, China’s central government used GDP growth as
a major indicator to evaluate performance of provincial and local governments; Li and Zhou
(2005) find that there was a significant effect of GDP growth on the probability of provincial
governors being promoted in China from 1979 to 2002. This kind of GDP competition was
not able to provide enough incentives for local governments to pursue long-run sustainable
development and environmental protection.
However, there have been major changes to environmental policies in the period of the
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005). The incentives of the central government to initiate this
regime shift in environmental management include concerns about legitimacy when environ-
mental pollution has caused social unrest and international pressure (Wang, 2013), as well
as increasing demand for better environmental quality of the growing urban middle class
in China (Zheng and Kahn, 2013). The Tenth Five-Year Plan adopted in 2000 set specific
targets to reduce major water and air pollutants for the first time in history. Furthermore,
laws to monitor and punish offenders for environmental pollution were amended and became
effective in the middle of 2003, requiring stricter environmental compliance. Moreover, there
have been more indicators of environmental quality in the explicit performance criteria of
provincial and local officials, including air pollution level (Landry, 2008). The central govern-
ment also uses preferential fiscal transfers as a way to encourage local governments to pursue
environmental goals (Liu and Zhang, 2011), as a large proportion of local public expenditure
in China relies on fiscal transfers from the central government under China’s current tax
revenue-sharing system4. Hence, provincial and local governments may have much stronger
incentives to free ride on trans-boundary environmental pollution after the policy-change, as
4The share of fiscal transfer in local public expenditure was 43.8% in 2010.
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they compete with each other to fulfill the targets of the central government under centrally
controlled personnel governance. Their intention can be realized by influencing the location
choices of firms by urban planning and land sales as basic policy tools (Zheng and Kahn,
2013), as land supply in China is totally controlled by governments, and the state-owned
enterprises controlled by local governments own a large share of local output. Zheng et al.
(2014) find that energy intensity and air pollution affect the promotion probability of mayors
in 86 Chinese cities. However, there are still questions on how environmental pollution really
matter for the promotion of local officials, as other factors, like corruption and connections
with central leaders, may affect the relationship between pollution and promotion of local
officials (Jia, 2017). The observed patterns of trans-boundary air pollution in the empirical
results of this chapter may be helpful to infer whether environmental pollution really matter
for the incentives facing provincial and local officials after the regime shift in environmental
management undertaken by the central government.
2.2.3 Trans-boundary Pollution and Empirical Strategy
Trans-boundary pollution has become an important research question in environmental e-
conomics as it affects the efficiency of decentralized environmental management. Since it is
easier to define “upstream” and “downstream” for river than air, and water pollution is un-
der decentralized management while air pollution is managed in a relatively more centralized
systems in countries like the United States, previous studies mainly focus on trans-boundary
river pollution. Early studies using traditional multivariate regression have found that river
pollution is generally higher in places near jurisdictional borders. Sigman (2002) uses data
from 291 river monitoring stations of the UN’s Global Emissions Monitoring System in 49
countries from 1979 to 1996, and finds that places just upstream of international borders
have higher levels of Biochemical Oxygen Demand than other places do. Helland and Whit-
ford (2003) use Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data in the United States from 1987 to 1996
to find that toxic chemical releases are higher in counties near state border. However, there
may be potential endogeneity problems when we observe correlation of having more pol-
lution and being nearer to jurisdictional border in these traditional multivariate regression
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analysis, because places near borders may differ in many dimensions from interior regions.
Hence, identification strategies based on treatment effects have been adopted in later studies
on trans-boundary river pollution.
More recent studies use DID methodology to estimate the effects of trans-boundary river
pollution under decentralized environmental management. Sigman (2005) uses the variation
in the time of U.S. states being authorized to manage river pollution via the Clean Water Act
to study whether trans-boundary pollution is higher when the states received authorization
to the act, and she finds a 4% degradation of water quality downstream of authorized states.
The natural experiment in this research is changes in the degree of decentralization. Changes
of jurisdictional borders are also used in some studies on trans-boundary river pollution.
Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016) use changes of county boundaries in each electoral cycle in
Brazil to find empirical evidence for the following hypotheses: pollution should increase
at an increasing rate as a river approaches a downstream exit border; there should be a
structural break in the slope of the pollution function at border; and a larger number of
managing jurisdictions should increase negative externalities. Different from both Sigman
(2005) and Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016), Cai et al. (2016) use changes to incentives facing
local governments when the central government changed environmental policy, in order to
study trans-boundary pollution in China’s 24 longest rivers. They find that after the policy
changes in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005), output in polluting industries 5 is
much higher in the most downstream counties in each province along the 24 rivers. I use
similar methods to define and calculate outputs in polluting industries for air pollutants,
and my empirical strategy is also based on changes of incentives facing local governments.
Since I am able to define downwind cities clearly based on a provincial dataset of wind
patterns, while China’s air pollution is under decentralized management and provincial and
local governments have significant flexibility to develop policies to deal with air pollution, my
research focuses on trans-boundary air pollution. I provide empirical evidence for whether
there has been more trans-boundary air pollution after the central government changed envi-
ronmental policies in China. Although it is difficult to define “upstream” and “downstream”
5The Report on the First National Census of Polluting Sources (MEP, 2010) defines seven industries as
polluting rivers.
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for air as clearly as for rivers, I define which cities in each province are “downwind” for
air pollution according to the patterns of wind direction, as discussed in Section 2.2.1. I
use DID estimations to explore whether the outputs in air-polluting industries are higher in
downwind cities near provincial borders after the reforms. Moreover, the additional informa-
tion of wind speed and standard deviation of wind direction leads to DDD estimations for
whether the effects of trans-boundary air pollution are more significant in downwind cities
with higher wind speed, or whether those effects are higher in downwind cities with more
stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of wind direction).
2.3 DATA SOURCE AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The empirical analysis in this chapter answers the following question. After the central
government changed environmental policies, are local governments dumping more air pollu-
tants in downwind cities near the provincial border? If inefficiencies associated with trans-
boundary pollution have increased after the policy changes, the following predictions can be
tested in my empirical analysis. (1) Outputs in air-polluting industries are relatively higher
in downwind cities near the provincial border after 2003. (2) This effect is more significant
in downwind cities with higher wind speed. (3) This effect is more significant in downwind
cities with more stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of wind direction). (4)
For non-polluting industries, this effect does not exist, or moves in the opposite direction.
I use total production output in polluting industries, aggregated from a firm-level dataset,
in order to measure the size of polluting activities in each city. This approach follows Cai et
al. (2016)’s empirical study on trans-boundary river pollution in China. According to their
introduction to the institutional background of China’s environmental management system,
the monitoring technology for pollutant discharges adopted by China’s central government
during the sample period (1998–2007) was very crude in that the pollutant discharges were
not measured directly. Instead, pollution discharges were estimated from output in polluting
industries. Industrial air pollution was estimated in the same way as water pollution, using
output data. In this chapter, owing to data limitations, I use the aggregated output data of
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polluting industries to measure the intensity of polluting activities, following the approach
of Cai et al. (2016) to estimate river pollution.
The city-level measures of the intensity of air-polluting activities are aggregate outputs
in the polluting industries of four major air pollutants (SO2, NO2, dust, and soot). These
variables are calculated using the dataset of the Annual Survey of Above-Scale Industrial
Firms (National Bureau of Statistics, 1998–2007). An above-scale industrial firm is that with
annual revenue above 5 million RMB (approximately 0.76 million U.S. dollars). The survey
covers all such firms and all other state-owned firms located in 286 major cities from 1998 to
2007. Similar to the definition of polluting industries for river pollution in Cai et al. (2016), I
define polluting industries for each kind of air pollutant according to the Report on the First
National Census of Polluting Sources (MEP, 2010). The four kinds of air pollutants listed
in this report are SO2, NO2, dust, and soot. Table 2 summarizes the two-digit polluting
industries for each kind of air pollutant according to MEP (2010). I calculate the aggregate
outputs in the polluting industries of those four major air pollutants in each city and in each
year during the period 1998–2007.
Different from previous studies on trans-boundary pollution, like the empirical works of
Sigman (2002, 2005) and Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016) on river pollution, which estimated
changes to pollutant level on the boundary, I instead consider industrial location choice when
subnational governments in China have more incentives to free ride on trans-boundary air
pollution. China’s provincial governments began locating more highly polluting industries
in downwind cities near provincial borders than in all other types of cities, after the cen-
tral government changed its environmental policy in 2003. I test this change to industrial
location directly through estimation of the output of polluting industries in downwind cities
near provincial borders, using a DID approach. There could be more outputs in air pol-
luting industries in downwind cities near provincial borders, there could be more outputs
in downwind cities with higher wind speed, and there could be more outputs in downwind
cities with more stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of wind direction).
First, for cities near a provincial border (distance of less than 100 km), I estimate the
effects on downwind cities after the policy changes in environmental management through
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DID estimation. The baseline estimation equation is shown in Equation (2.1) as follows.
Pollutionit = β0 + β1 ·Downwindi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit (2.1)
The subscript i in Equation (2.1) denotes city, while t denotes year. Pollutionit denotes
city level air pollution intensity. The interaction term between Postt and Downwindi is
the key explanatory variable for estimating the treatment effects of the policy changes in
environmental management. Postt is a dummy variable indicating time of the policy changes.
Downwindi is a dummy variable indicating whether the city i is in a downwind part of the
province, according to the wind patterns in Figure 2. I test whether β1, the coefficient
of interaction term between Downwindi and Postt is significantly positive, which is the
parameter of interest that indicates whether provincial governments dump more air-polluting
industries to downwind cities near provincial border after the policy changes. X is a set of
other control variables, which are the city level socio-economic characteristics that may
affect air pollution, including population size, size of industrial output, population density,
GDP per capita6, industrial structure, percentage of government expenditure, and share of
foreign investment. The data sources for control variables are from every year’s China Urban
Statistical Yearbook. αi is the city fixed effects. γt is the year fixed effects. εit is the random
error term.
Second, wind speed is added to the estimation to show whether outputs of air polluting
activities are higher in downwind cities with higher average wind speed. A DDD estimation
is shown in Equation (2.2) as follows.
Pollutionit = β0 + β1 ·Downwindi × Postt + β2 ·Wind Speedi × Postt
+β3 ·Downwindi ×Wind Speedi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(2.2)
Wind Speedi is average wind speed. The coefficient of the interaction term Downwindi×
Wind Speedi × Postt is the DDD estimator for whether intensity of air-polluting activities
is higher after the policy changes in downwind cities with higher average wind speed. The
hypothetical trans-boundary air pollution after policy changes predicts a positive sign for
β3, which is the parameters of interest in Equation (2.2).
6I also include its square term to control for possible environmental Kuznets curve effects.
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Third, standard deviation of wind direction is added to the estimation to show whether
outputs of air-polluting activities are higher in downwind cities with more stable wind direc-
tion (smaller standard deviation of wind direction). A DDD estimation is shown in Equation
(2.3) as follows.
Pollutionit = β0 + β1 ·Downwindi × Postt + β2 ·Direction Stdi × Postt
+β3 ·Downwindi ×Direction Stdi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(2.3)
Direction Stdi is the standard deviation of wind direction. The coefficient of the in-
teraction term Downwindi × Direction Stdi × Postt is the DDD estimator for whether
intensity of air-polluting activities is higher after the policy changes in downwind cities with
more stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of wind direction). The hypothetical
trans-boundary air pollution after policy changes predicts a positive sign for β2 and negative
sign for β3, which are the parameters of interest in Equation 2.3.
Next, for a sample of all cities, a DDD estimation is based on whether the city is near
a provincial border, whether the city is downwind, and time of the reforms. The estimation
equation is shown in Equation (2.4) as follows.
Pollutionit = β0 + β1 ·Borderi × Postt + β2 ·Downwindi × Postt
+β3 ·Borderi ×Downwindi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(2.4)
The coefficient of the interaction termBorderi×Downwindi×Postt is the DDD estimator
for whether intensity of air-polluting activities is higher after the policy changes in cities near
a provincial border and in a downwind part of the province. The hypothetical trans-boundary
air pollution after policy changes predicts a positive sign for β3, which is the parameter of
interest in Equation (2.4).
Finally, a DDD estimation is based on distance to provincial border, whether the city is
downwind, and time of the reforms. The estimation equation is shown in Equation 2.5 as
follows.
Pollutionit = β0 + β1 ·Distance Borderi × Postt + β2 ·Downwindi × Postt
+β3 ·Distance Borderi ×Downwindi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(2.5)
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Distance Borderi is the city’s distance to a provincial border. For the estimations on
all cities, distance to provincial border should be controlled, because the effects of trans-
boundary pollution may be significant only in cities located not too far from a provincial
border, and the effects may be larger in cities closer to a provincial border. The coefficient
of the interaction term Distance Borderi × Downwindi × Postt is the DDD estimator for
whether intensity of air-polluting activities is higher after the policy changes in cities closer
to a provincial border and in a downwind part of the province. The hypothetical trans-
boundary air pollution after policy changes predicts a positive sign for β2 and a negative
sign for β3, which are the parameters of interest in this regression equation. Table 3 shows
the summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis.
2.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
2.4.1 Difference-in-differences Estimations for Cities near Border
First, I report the results for DID estimations based on Equation (2.1) in Table 4, which
uses interaction terms between Distance Border and year dummies Post2000 and Post2003.
Since the years 2000 and 2003 were the time of major policy changes, Post2000 (Post2003)
is a dummy variable that equals 1 after year 2000 (2003), and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variables in all columns of Table 4 are annual outputs in polluting industries for each kind
of pollutant according to the definition in Table 2. Columns (1) to (3) are estimation results
for pollutant SO2. The specification in Column (1) is without any control variable, and
the parameters of interest are not statistically significant. In Column (2), when population
size and total output of industrial firms are controlled, the coefficient of the interaction
term Downwind × Post2003 is significantly positive (2.526), which implies that annual
output in polluting industries of SO2 is higher by 2.526 billion RMB (approximately 382
million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities after 2003. The coefficient of the interaction term
Downwind × Post2000 is not statistically significant, which implies that the effect did not
exist at the beginning. In Column (3), when a set of other control variables is controlled,
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the coefficient of the interaction term Downwind × Post2003 is also significantly positive
(3.245), which implies that annual output in polluting industries of SO2 is higher by 3.245
billion RMB (approximately 490 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities after 2003. The
coefficient of the interaction term Downwind×Post2000 is not statistically significant, which
implies that the effect did not exist at the beginning. Columns (4) to (6) are the estimation
results for pollutant NO2. The general patterns of the results are very similar to those
for SO2. In Column (6), when all the control variables are included, the coefficient of the
interaction term Downwind× Post2003 is significantly positive (2.908), which implies that
annual output in polluting industries of NO2 is higher by 2.908 billion RMB (approximately
435 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities after 2003. The coefficient of the interaction
term Downwind×Post2000 is not statistically significant, which implies that the effect did
not exist at the beginning. Figure 4 shows trends before and after the policy changes in the
two groups of cities.
The results in Table 5 are also based on the specification of Equation (2.2), with different
dependent variables. Columns (1) to (3) are the estimation results for pollutant Soot. The
specification in Column (1) is without any control variable, and the parameters of interest
are not statistically significant. In Column (2), when population size and total output of
industrial firms are controlled, the coefficient of the interaction termDownwind×Post2000 is
significantly positive (1.033), which implies that the annual output in polluting industries of
Soot is higher by 1.033 billion RMB (approximately 156 million U.S. dollars) in downwind
cities after 2000. The coefficient of the interaction term Downwind × Post2003 is also
significantly positive (3.356), which implies that annual output in polluting industries of
Soot is higher by 3.356 billion RMB (approximately 507 million U.S. dollars) in downwind
cities after 2003. In Column (3), when a set of other control variables is controlled, the
coefficient of the interaction term Downwind×Post2000 is still significantly positive (1.340),
which implies that annual output in polluting industries of Soot is higher by 1.340 billion
RMB (approximately 202 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities after 2000. The coefficient
of the interaction term Downwind × Post2003 is also significantly positive (4.117), which
implies that annual output in polluting industries of Soot is higher by 4.117 billion RMB
(approximately 622 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities after 2003. Columns (4) to (6) are
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the estimation results for pollutant Dust. In Column (5) and (6), when control variables are
included, neitherDownwind×Post2000 norDownwind×Post2003 is statistically significant,
which implies that the effects on downwind cities for SO2, NO2 and Soot are insignificant
for pollutant Dust. Figure 5 shows trends before and after the policy changes in the two
groups of cities. Figure 6 shows that the share of polluting industries in downwind cities is
higher after the policy changes.
2.4.2 Triple-differences Estimations for More Wind Patterns and More Cities
Table 6 reports the results for the DDD estimations using average wind speed, based on
the specification in Equation (2.2). All columns are estimated using fixed-effect models, in
which I also include control variables of socio-economic characteristics and dummy variables
for year fixed effects. Column (1) shows the estimation result for pollutant SO2. While the
interaction terms with Post2000 are not statistically significant, the DDD interaction term
Downwind ×Wind Speed × Post2003 is significantly positive (0.523), and the interaction
term Downwind×Post2003 is negative (-2.640) but not statistically significant. This result
implies that the effects of trans-boundary air pollution are stronger in downwind cities with
higher average wind speed. I also calculate the estimated marginal effects of Downwind
at different percentiles of WindSpeed, which shows that the effect at the 90th percentile
of Wind Speed (15.5 km/h) is 5.46, and the effect at the 25th percentile of Wind Speed
(10.3 km/h) is 2.75. Column (2) shows the estimation result for pollutant NO2. While both
Downwind×Wind Speed×Post2003 and Downwind×Post2003 are positive but insignifi-
cant, the estimated marginal effects of Downwind at different percentiles of Wind Speed are
significantly positive. The effect at the 90th percentile of Wind Speed (15.5 km/h) is 3.82,
and the effect at the 25th percentile of Wind Speed (10.3 km/h) is 2.62. Column (3) shows
the estimation result for pollutant Soot. The general patterns of the estimated coefficients
are very similar to those in Column (1), and the marginal effect at the 90th percentile of
Wind Speed (15.5 km/h) is 7.29, while the effect at the 25th percentile of Wind Speed
(10.3 km/h) is 3.73. Column (4) shows the estimation result for pollutant Dust, and the
parameters of interest are not statistically significant.
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Table 7 reports the results for the DDD estimations using standard deviation of wind
direction, based on the specification in Equation (2.3). All columns are estimated using fixed-
effect models, in which I also include the control variables of socio-economic characteristics
and dummy variables for year fixed effects. Column (1) shows the estimation result for pol-
lutant SO2. While the DDD interaction term Downwind×Direction Std×Post2000 is not
statistically significant, the DDD interaction term Downwind×Direction Std×Post2003 is
significantly negative (-0.0753), and the interaction termDownwind×Post2003 is significant-
ly positive (7.618). This finding implies that the effects of trans-boundary air pollution are
stronger in downwind cities with more stable wind direction (smaller standard deviation of
wind direction). I also calculate the estimated marginal effects of Downwind at different per-
centiles of Direction Std, which shows that the effect at the 10th percentile of Direction Std
(42.9) is 4.39, and the effect at the 50th percentile of Direction Std (68.4) is 2.47. The effect
becomes statistically insignificant at the 75th percentile of Direction Std (88.4). Column (2)
shows the estimation result for pollutant NO2. While Downwind×Direction Std×Post2003
is negative but not statistically significant, Downwind×Post2003 is still significantly positive
(6.725). The marginal effect at the 10th percentile of Direction Std (42.9) is 3.87, and the
effect at the 50th percentile of Direction Std (68.4) is 2.10. The effect becomes statistically
insignificant at the 75th percentile of Direction Std (88.4). Column (3) shows the estimation
result for pollutant Soot. The general patterns of estimated coefficients are very similar to
those in Column (2), and the marginal effect at the 10th percentile of Direction Std (42.9)
is 5.48, while the effect at the 50th percentile of Direction Std (68.4) is 3.59. The effect
becomes statistically insignificant at the 75th percentile of Direction Std (88.4). Column
(4) shows the estimation result for pollutant Dust, and the parameters of interest are not
statistically significant.
Next, I estimate Equation (2.4) for the sample of all cities and report the results in Table
8. This is a DDD estimation based on whether the city is near a provincial border, whether
the city is downwind, and time of the reforms. All columns are estimated using fixed-
effect models, in which I also include the control variables of socio-economic characteristics
and dummy variables for year fixed effects. Columns (1) shows the estimation results for
pollutant SO2. The DDD interaction term Border×Downwind×Post2003 is significantly
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positive (8.332), while the interaction terms Downwind×Post2003 and Border×Post2003
are negative (-5.190 and -1.114, respectively). This result implies that the aggregate effect
on annual output of polluting industries for pollutant SO2 is 2.028 billion RMB higher in an
average downwind city near a provincial border. Columns (2) shows the estimation result for
pollutant NO2. The DDD interaction term Border×Downwind×Post2003 is significantly
positive (8.422), while the interaction terms Downwind×Post2003 and Border×Post2003
are negative (-5.369 and -1.609 respectively). This result implies that the aggregate effect on
the annual output of polluting industries for pollutant NO2 is 1.444 billion RMB higher in an
average downwind city near provincial border. Columns (3) shows the estimation results for
pollutant Soot. The DDD interaction term Border×Downwind×Post2003 is significantly
positive (6.063), while the interaction terms Downwind×Post2003 and Border×Post2003
are negative (-2.068 and -3.374, respectively). This result implies that the aggregate effect
on the annual output of polluting industries for pollutant Soot is 0.621 billion RMB higher
in an average downwind city near a provincial border.
Finally, I estimate Equation (2.5) for the sample of all cities and report the results in
Table 9. This is a DDD estimation based on distance to provincial border, whether the city
is downwind, and time of the reforms. All columns are estimated using fixed-eefect models,
in which I also include the control variables of socio-economic characteristics and dummy
variables for year fixed effects. Column (1) shows the estimation results for pollutant SO2,
and Column (2) shows the estimation results for pollutant NO2. The parameters of interest
in these two columns are not statistically significant, but the signs of Distance Border ×
Downwind × Post2003 are negative and the signs of Downwind × Post2003 are positive,
which is consistent with the findings in Table 4. Column (3) shows the estimation results
for pollutant Soot. Distance Border×Downwind× Post2003 is significantly negative and
Downwind×Post2003 is significantly positive, which is consistent with the findings in Table
5. I also calculate the estimated marginal effects of Downwind at different percentiles of
Distance Border, which shows that the effect at the 5th percentile of Distance Border
(14km) is 5.55, and the effect at the 50th percentile of Distance Border (62km) is 3.03.
This result implies that the output in polluting industries of soot is relatively higher in
the most downwind regions after the policy changes, and the effect decreases with greater
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distance from the province border. Column (4) shows the estimation result for pollutant
Dust; the parameters of interest are not statistically significant, with different signs.
2.4.3 The Effects of Neighboring Highly Populated Cities
One interesting aspect to study is whether provincial leaders care about the risk of pollut-
ing highly populated neighboring cities arising from potential exposure by media or other
pressures, when they take advantage of trans-boundary pollution in downwind cities close
to a provincial border. There are two main reasons that provincial and local governments
might not be willing to pollute neighboring megacities. First, the politicians of big cities
have higher probability of being promoted and of becoming future leaders of provincial and
central government. Landry (2008) finds that the probability of being promoted is higher
for the mayors of cities with higher population, higher GDP per capita, and higher economic
growth. Moreover, Landry (2008) shows that there are 10 megacities among the top 15
cities in 2000 based on economic progress since city mayors of the time were appointed, and
economic performance is the most important indicator in determining the outcomes of pro-
motion competition among provincial and local politicians (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011).
Megacities are the most important places for the competition of promotion. Second, under a
state-controlled media system with limited freedom of press, megacities with more political
significance have greater influence on news media. Nearly all influential news media in Chi-
na (newspapers, radio, and television stations) are located in major big cities, and they are
either controlled or censored by the government (Latham, 2000; Stockmann and Gallagher,
2011). Meanwhile, economic reforms toward a market economy has resulted in most media
institutions in China financing themselves via advertising revenues, instead of relying on
state subsidies (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). The larger market potential in megacities
encourages most news media to focus on events occurring in those cities. Therefore, pollution
in neighboring megacities is more likely to be exposed by news media, and this may be of
concern to provincial governments when they decide where to locate air-polluting industries.
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for the effects of being neighboring to highly popu-
lated big cities on the share of air-polluting industries. All cities in Table 10 are downwind
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cities, and Panel A shows the sub-sample of downwind cities located close to highly popu-
lated megacities (urban population greater than 1 million) in the downwind direction, while
Panel B shows the subsample of downwind cities that are not located close to any megac-
ities in the downwind direction. The results clearly suggest that the increase in the share
of air-polluting industries for each air pollutant after 2003 is larger and more significant
in downwind cities that are not located close to any megacities in the downwind direction.
This result implies that when provincial governments began to dump more air pollution to
downwind cities after the policy changes in 2003, they were more likely to increase the share
of polluting industries in downwind cities that were not located close to any megacities in
the downwind direction. As there is a much higher risk of polluting highly populated neigh-
boring cities arising from potential exposure by media or other pressures in the cities close
to megacities in the downwind direction, provincial leaders may strategically respond to this
risk when they take advantage of trans-boundary pollution in the downwind cities close to
provincial border.
Tables 11–13 present some regression results to confirm the above mentioned findings.
In Tables 11 and 12, I add a dummy variable Near Megacity, which takes the value of 1
when a city is close to a highly populated megacity (urban population greater than 1 mil-
lion) in the downwind direction, and its interaction terms with time dummies Post2000 and
Post2003 in the regression equations. Although Near Megacity is positive, the interaction
terms Near Megacity × Post2000 and NearMegacity × Post2003 are negative, and the
overall effects of Near Megacity become negative after 2003, which means that the share
of air-polluting industries is lower in cities located close to highly populated megacities in
the downwind direction. In Table 11, the model specification is according to Equation (2.4),
and patterns of other variables are similar to the findings in Table 8. In Table 12, the model
specification is according to Equation (2.5), and patterns of other variables are similar to the
findings in Table 9. Meanwhile, the interaction term Downwind×Post2003 becomes signif-
icantly positive, and interaction term Distance Border ×Downwind × Post2003 becomes
significantly negative for pollutant SO2 and NO2 in this regression, which is consistent with
the pattern of more trans-boundary pollution after 2003. Table 13 reports the estimation re-
sults for regressions, including the term Near Initial Megacity, which is a dummy variable
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for whether the city is located close to megacities in the downwind direction before 2000. The
significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term Near Initial Megacity × Post2003
implies that when a city is located close to highly populated megacities in the downwind
direction before 2000, the share of air polluting industries is relatively lower after 2003 than
that of other cities not located close to any megacities in the downwind direction. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that provincial governors may care about the risk of
polluting highly populated neighboring cities arising from potential exposure by news media
or other pressures.
2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, I perform several robustness checks for the estimation results. The first group
is shown in Table 14, in which I replace the dependent variables of outputs in polluting indus-
tries in Table 9 with aggregated outputs in several groups of non-polluting industries defined
in Table 2. The dependent variable in Column (1) is aggregated outputs in all non-polluting
industries for air pollution. The dependent variable in Column (2) is aggregated outputs for
the combination of two-digit industries of food production (14), beverage production (15),
textile (17), garments manufacture (18), and leather, furs, feather and related products (19).
The dependent variable in Column (3) is aggregated outputs for the combination of two-
digit industries of furniture manufacturing (21), printing (23), Cultural and sports appliances
(24), medical and pharmaceutical products (27), and rubber products (29). The dependent
variable in Column (4) is aggregated outputs for the combination of two-digit industries of
plastic products (30), metal products (34), general appliances manufacturing (35), special
appliances manufacturing (36), transportation appliances manufacturing (37), and electric
appliances manufacturing (39). The dependent variable in Column (5) is aggregated outputs
for the combination of two-digit industries of electronic appliances manufacturing (40), office
appliances manufacturing (41), handicrafts manufacturing (42), cooking gas production (45),
and water production (46). None of the five columns resembles the estimation results using
the outputs in polluting industries for the four kinds of air pollutants SO2, NO2, Dust, and
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Soot in Table 9. Hence, the effects of trans-boundary air pollution found in Table 9 for the
polluting industries do not exist for those non-polluting industries.
Tables 15–17 replicate the estimations in Tables 4–7, with a smaller sample of cities that
have a distance to provincial border of less than 80 km. There are no major changes in these
results from the previous findings, and therefore, the main results of more trans-boundary
pollution in downwind cities after the policy changes still hold. Tables 18–20 further restrict
the sample cities to a smaller group that have a distance to provincial border of less than 60
km, and the main results are still robust.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Trans-boundary pollution is one of the major potential disadvantages of decentralized en-
vironmental management. Owing to asymmetric patterns of wind direction, places located
downwind may suffer more trans-boundary air pollution. In this chapter, I empirically
analyze trans-boundary air pollution under China’s regionally decentralized environmental
management, and find some evidence that polluting activities are relatively higher in the
most downwind cities near provincial borders after the incentives of provincial and local offi-
cials were changed by the policies of the central government. From the DID estimations for
the cities near a provincial border (a distance of less than 100 km), I find that the outputs
of polluting industries for pollutants SO2, NO2, and soot are relatively higher in downwind
cities after 2003. The DDD estimations further show that the effects of trans-boundary
air pollution are stronger in the downwind cities with higher average wind speed, and the
effects are also stronger in the downwind cities with more stable wind direction (smaller
standard deviation of wind direction). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that subnational governments free ride more on trans-boundary air pollution after the cen-
tral government implemented stricter environmental standards, and this kind of free-riding
behavior at least partly explains the reason that environmental pollution has not been mit-
igated in China even after the policy-change in environmental management initiated by the
central government since the early 2000s.
24
The RDA regime has been considered as the fundamental institution behind China’s
rapid economic growth in the past several decades. However, the competition among local
officials for promotion under the RDA regime is not able to provide enough incentives for
local governments to pursue long-run sustainable development and environmental protection.
When the central government begins to pursue environmental goals, distorted incentives
facing local officials are likely to have caused more significant trans-boundary environmental
pollution, which greatly reduces the efficiency of decentralized environmental management.
Given the existence of negative trans-boundary externalities, reforms in political institutions
and decentralized environmental management system are necessary to mitigate air pollution
in China effectively.
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Figure 1: Production and Consumption of Coal in China (Unit: Million Metric Tonnes)
26
Figure 2: Dominant Wind Directions in China
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Figure 3: Downwind and Upwind Cities in Henan Province
Figure 4: Trends of Polluting Industries (SO2 and NO2)
28
Figure 5: Trends of Polluting Industries (Soot and Dust)
Figure 6: Share of Polluting Industries in Downwind Cities
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Table 1: Wind Patterns in China’s Provinces
Province (Provincial capital)
Average wind
speed (km/h)
Average wind
direction (◦)
Standard deviation of
wind direction (◦)
Hebei (Shijiazhuang) 7.6 140.5 (SE) 9.9
Shanxi (Taiyuan) 11.2 183.5 (S) 75.9
Inner Mongolia (Hohhot) 12.5 172.3 (S) 82.8
Liaoning (Shenyang) 13.5 134.8 (SE) 88.4
Jilin (Changchun) 14.2 219.3 (SW) 39.7
Heilongjiang (Harbin) 15.5 174.2 (S) 42.9
Jiangsu (Nanjing) 12.8 112.0 (ESE) 47.0
Zhejiang (Hangzhou) 11.5 54.3 (NE) 68.4
Anhui (Hefei) 11.8 117.8 (ESE) 69.3
Fujian (Fuzhou) 18.9 74.8 (ENE) 68.8
Jiangxi (Nanchang) 6.7 61.7 (ENE) 53.6
Shandong (Jinan) 10.5 134.8 (SE) 55.2
Henan (Zhengzhou) 11.8 95.3 (E) 77.6
Hubei (Wuhan) 11.2 82.3 (E) 55.3
Hunan (Changsha) 10.3 318.4 (NW) 10.3
Guangdong (Guangzhou) 11.3 117.8 (ESE) 111.9
Guangxi (Nanning) 11.0 155.3 (SSE) 95.1
Hainan (Haikou) 15.8 106.4 (ESE) 71.8
Sichuan (Chengdu) 8.0 307.0 (NW) 92.7
Guizhou (Guiyang) 10.7 50.2 (NE) 66.0
Yunnan (Kunming) 21.1 221.2 (SW) 9.0
Shaanxi (Xian) 11.3 44.8 (NE) 43.8
Gansu (Lanzhou) 10.7 39.0 (NE) 65.3
Qinghai (Xining) 6.3 121.4 (ESE) 88.7
Ningxia (Yinchuan) 7.5 305.2 (NW) 95.1
Xinjiang (Urumqi) 8.9 325.9 (NW) 59.5
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Table 2: The Polluting and Non-polluting Industries for Air Pollutants
Pollutant Two-digit Industry
SO2
Petroleum and nuclear fuel processing (25), Chemical materials and
products (26), Non-metal mineral products (31), Ferrous metals
smelting and pressing (32), Non-ferrous metals smelting and
pressing (33), Power production (44)
NO2
Petroleum and nuclear fuel processing (25), Chemical materials and
products (26), Non-metal mineral products (31), Ferrous metals
smelting and pressing (32), Power production (44)
Soot
Agricultural products and byproducts (13), Pulp and paper
production (22), Chemical materials and products (26), Non-metal
mineral products (31), Ferrous metals smelting and pressing (32),
Power production (44)
Dust
Processing of wood, bamboo, and straw (20), Petroleum and
nuclear fuel processing (25), Non-metal mineral products (31),
Ferrous metals smelting and pressing (32)
Other water
polluting
industries
Beverage production (15), Textile (17), Metal products (34),
General appliances manufacturing (35), Transportation appliances
manufacturing (37)
Non-polluting
industries
Food production (14), Garments manufacture (18), Leather, furs, feather
and related products (19), Furniture manufacturing (21), Printing (23),
Cultural and sports appliances (24), Medical and pharmaceutical
products (27),Rubber products (29), Plastic products (30), Special
appliances manufacturing (36), Electric appliances manufacturing (39),
Electronic appliances manufacturing (40), Office appliances manufacturing
(41), Handicrafts manufacturing (42), Cooking gas production (45),
Water production (46)
Note: According to Report on the First National Census of Polluting Sources (MEP, 2010), two-
digit codes in parentheses.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Polluting Industries
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Dependent variables
Output in polluting industries:
Output SO2 (unit: 1 billion RMB) 2727 20.14 40.628 0.002 577.223
Output NO2 (unit: 1 billion RMB) 2727 18.067 37.591 0.002 534.178
Output Dust (unit: 1 billion RMB) 2727 10.59 22.929 0 307.935
Output Soot (unit: 1 billion RMB) 2727 16.237 29.532 0.002 370.139
Independent variables
Average wind speed:
Wind Speed (unit: km/h)
2860 11.139 3.387 3.5 21.1
Standard deviation of wind direction:
Direction Std (unit: ◦) 2860 66.518 25.241 9 111.9
Distance to provincial border:
Distance Border (unit: 10 km)
2860 7.622 5.32 0.1 36.8
Distance to provincial capital:
Distance Capital (unit: 10 km)
2860 17.795 14.087 0 112.3
Population size:
Population (unit: 10,000 persons)
2698 119.432 146.124 14.08 1526.02
Total output of industrial firms:
Industrial Output (unit: 1 billion RMB)
2727 62.828 137.742 0.002 2225.147
Population density:
Population Density (unit: 10,000 /km2)
2672 0.097 0.052 0.001 1.094
GDP per capita:
GDP (unit: 10,000 RMB)
2691 2.001 2.043 0.184 32.025
Percentage of secondary industry in GDP:
Secondary Industry
2726 49.578 12.946 8.05 92.3
Percentage of tertiary industry in GDP:
Tertiary Industry
2726 41.046 10.259 7.3 81
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Table 3 (continued).
Total number of above-scale firms:
Firm number
2691 765.155 1306.484 1 15520
Percentage of government expenditure in GDP:
Government Expenditure
2676 11.175 9.443 0 195.922
Percentage of FDI in GDP:
FDI
2860 3.435 5.296 0 134.592
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Table 4: Air-polluting Industries in Cities near Provincial Borders (SO2 and NO2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output SO2 Output SO2 Output NO2 Output NO2 Output NO2
Downwind × Post2000 -1.239 0.830 1.080 -1.052 0.846 0.907
(0.811) (0.505) (0.678) (0.795) (0.546) (0.686)
Downwind × Post2003 -3.959 2.526* 3.245** -3.352 2.596* 2.908**
(3.297) (1.276) (1.279) (2.980) (1.340) (1.202)
Population 0.0595 0.0719* 0.0573 0.0676
(0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0434) (0.0454)
Industrial Output 0.346*** 0.331*** 0.314*** 0.303***
(0.0179) (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0213)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,970 1,714 1,696 1,970 1,714 1,696
R-squared 0.263 0.858 0.865 0.239 0.840 0.845
Number of cities 209 209 209 209 209 209
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to
control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry,
share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 5: Air-polluting Industries in Cities near Provincial Borders (Soot and Dust)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Output Soot Output Soot Output Soot Output Dust Output Dust Output Dust
Downwind × Post2000 -0.109 1.033*** 1.340** -1.136** -0.131 -0.0665
(0.554) (0.370) (0.518) (0.483) (0.348) (0.432)
Downwind × Post2003 -0.692 3.356* 4.117*** -2.504 0.815 0.281
(3.028) (1.827) (1.352) (1.915) (1.109) (0.857)
Population 0.0505* 0.0611*** 0.0164 0.0218
(0.0257) (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0245)
Industrial Output 0.214*** 0.204*** 0.180*** 0.175***
(0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0173) (0.0212)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,970 1,714 1,696 1,970 1,714 1,696
R-squared 0.311 0.818 0.830 0.228 0.728 0.735
Number of cities 209 209 209 209 209 209
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to control
endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry, share of
tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 6: Triple-differences Estimation with Wind Speed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2000 0.158 0.0244 0.326** -0.135
(0.163) (0.174) (0.152) (0.121)
Downwind × Post2000 -0.647 0.656 -2.248 1.435
(1.608) (1.725) (1.585) (1.316)
Wind Speed × Post2000 -0.117 -0.0324 -0.120 -0.0114
(0.146) (0.146) (0.120) (0.123)
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2003 0.523** 0.232 0.685*** -0.208
(0.235) (0.221) (0.247) (0.248)
Downwind × Post2003 -2.640 0.224 -3.320 2.341
(2.222) (2.231) (2.539) (2.667)
Wind Speed × Post2003 -0.695 -0.468 -0.292* -0.365
(0.516) (0.571) (0.153) (0.557)
Population 0.0725* 0.0682 0.0603*** 0.0231
(0.0423) (0.0463) (0.0207) (0.0260)
Industrial Output 0.333*** 0.305*** 0.205*** 0.175***
(0.0205) (0.0219) (0.0152) (0.0218)
Est. Marginal effect of Downwind at:
90th Pctile of Wind Speed (15.5) 5.46** 3.82* 7.29*** -0.88
(2.02) (1.90) (1.98) (1.61)
75th Pctile of Wind Speed (11.8) 3.53** 2.96** 4.76*** -0.11
(1.36) (1.34) (1.36) (1.00)
50th Pctile of Wind Speed (11.2) 3.22** 2.82** 4.35*** 0.01
(1.28) (1.28) (1.30) (0.95)
25th Pctile of Wind Speed (10.3) 2.75** 2.62** 3.73*** 0.20
(1.18) (1.20) (1.22) (0.91)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6 (continued).
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696
R-squared 0.866 0.846 0.831 0.737
Number of cities 209 209 209 209
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output
are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita
GDP, share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 7: Triple-differences Estimation with Standard Deviation of Wind Direction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2000 -0.0205 -0.0228 -0.00857 -0.0134
(0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0187) (0.0129)
Downwind × Post2000 2.365* 2.333 1.853 0.788
(1.376) (1.465) (1.345) (0.745)
Direction Std × Post2000 0.00391 0.00198 0.00154 -0.00133
(0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.00928)
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2003 -0.0753* -0.0665 -0.0739 -0.0285
(0.0424) (0.0400) (0.0447) (0.0341)
Downwind × Post2003 7.618* 6.725* 8.648** 1.766
(3.785) (3.588) (3.390) (2.311)
Direction Std × Post2003 -0.0497 -0.0564 0.0223 -0.0688
(0.0757) (0.0814) (0.0325) (0.0761)
Population 0.0701* 0.0657 0.0606*** 0.0201
(0.0405) (0.0445) (0.0212) (0.0237)
Industrial Output 0.331*** 0.303*** 0.204*** 0.175***
(0.0197) (0.0210) (0.0156) (0.0209)
Est. Marginal effect of Downwind at:
10th Pctile of Direction Std (42.9) 4.39** 3.87* 5.48*** 0.54
(2.13) (2.01) (1.74) (1.24)
25th Pctile of Direction Std (47) 4.08** 3.60* 5.18*** 0.43
(1.99) (1.88) (1.61) (1.18)
50th Pctile of Direction Std (68.4) 2.47* 2.18* 3.59*** -0.18
(1.37) (1.27) (1.21) (1.14)
75th Pctile of Direction Std (88.4) 0.96 0.85 2.12 -0.75
(1.19) (1.07) (1.43) (1.47)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7 (continued).
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696
R-squared 0.866 0.847 0.831 0.739
Number of cities 209 209 209 209
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *
at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are
lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP,
share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 8: Triple-differences Estimation for All Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Border × Downwind × Post2000 3.002 2.659 2.754** 1.121
(1.855) (1.761) (1.286) (1.273)
Downwind × Post2000 -1.879 -1.726 -1.352 -1.181
(1.734) (1.569) (1.261) (1.056)
Border × Post2000 0.510 0.404 -0.225 0.241
(0.703) (0.659) (0.576) (0.638)
Border × Downwind × Post2003 8.332** 8.422** 6.063** 3.662
(3.360) (3.431) (2.648) (3.210)
Downwind × Post2003 -5.190 -5.369 -2.068 -3.110
(3.416) (3.265) (1.985) (2.748)
Border × Post2003 -1.114 -1.609 -3.374 -0.164
(1.736) (1.759) (2.382) (2.441)
Population 0.0426 0.0356 0.0480** 0.00619
(0.0286) (0.0311) (0.0176) (0.0143)
Industrial Output 0.346*** 0.316*** 0.235*** 0.166***
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0304) (0.0154)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.847 0.821 0.803 0.711
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and
Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: popu-
lation density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expen-
diture, and FDI.
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Table 9: Triple-differences Estimation for All Cities (with Distance to Border)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2000 -0.189 -0.144 -0.240** -0.00396
(0.117) (0.114) (0.0981) (0.0758)
Downwind × Post2000 1.572 1.203 2.307*** -0.295
(0.933) (0.978) (0.690) (0.602)
Distance Border × Post2000 -0.0515 -0.0465 0.0507 -0.0504
(0.0485) (0.0406) (0.0471) (0.0452)
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2003 -0.578 -0.552 -0.525* -0.0361
(0.372) (0.354) (0.287) (0.260)
Downwind × Post2003 4.406 4.188 6.289** -0.408
(2.713) (2.711) (2.540) (1.856)
Distance Border × Post2003 -0.0872 -0.0600 0.322* -0.186
(0.182) (0.184) (0.169) (0.213)
Population 0.0425 0.0355 0.0476** 0.00612
(0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0177) (0.0144)
Industrial Output 0.346*** 0.315*** 0.235*** 0.165***
(0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0300) (0.0153)
Est. Marginal effect of Downwind at:
5th Pctile of Distance Border (14km) 3.60 3.42 5.55** -0.46
(2.28) (2.29) (2.17) (1.54)
10th Pctile of Distance Border (21km) 3.19 3.03 5.19** -0.48
(2.08) (2.09) (2.00) (1.40)
25th Pctile of Distance Border (37km) 2.27 2.15 4.35** -0.54
(1.68) (1.69) (1.61) (1.10)
50th Pctile of Distance Border (62km) 0.83 0.77 3.03** -0.63
(1.39) (1.34) (1.13) (1.87)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9 (continued).
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.847 0.821 0.804 0.712
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are lagged
by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of
secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 10: Share of Air Polluting Industries in Downwind Cities
Panel A: Near Megacity (Population > 1 million) in Downwind Direction
SO2 Share NO2 Share Soot Share Dust Share
Before 2000 0.335 0.321 0.378 0.163
(Std. Dev.) (0.179) (0.173) (0.173) (0.175)
After 2003 0.365 0.336 0.354 0.186
(Std. Dev.) (0.184) (0.180) (0.164) (0.154)
Difference 0.030 0.015 -0.025 0.022
(Std. Err.) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Panel B: No Megacity (Population > 1 million) Near in Downwind Direction
SO2 Share NO2 Share Soot Share Dust Share
Before 2000 0.323 0.295 0.344 0.155
(Std. Dev.) (0.167) (0.159) (0.137) (0.133)
After 2003 0.398 0.340 0.384 0.198
(Std. Dev.) (0.182) (0.171) (0.169) (0.172)
Difference 0.075** 0.045** 0.040** 0.043**
(Std. Err.) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
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Table 11: The Effects of Neighboring Megacities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Border × Downwind × Post2000 3.828** 3.470** 3.110** 1.536
(1.694) (1.687) (1.160) (1.383)
Downwind × Post2000 -2.610* -2.448* -1.656 -1.553
(1.531) (1.405) (1.147) (1.117)
Border × Post2000 0.767 0.632 -0.0531 0.345
(0.739) (0.695) (0.661) (0.607)
Border × Downwind × Post2003 9.108*** 9.079** 6.499** 3.985
(3.254) (3.427) (2.758) (3.309)
Downwind × Post2003 -5.888* -5.961* -2.428 -3.410
(3.106) (3.048) (2.146) (2.720)
Border × Post2003 -1.123 -1.618 -3.347 -0.177
(1.573) (1.607) (2.424) (2.355)
Near Megacity 4.092** 3.709** 2.599 1.718
(1.642) (1.667) (1.790) (1.546)
Near Megacity × Post2000 -0.610 -0.808 0.171 -0.498
(0.800) (0.801) (0.728) (0.503)
Near Megacity × Post2003 -4.035** -3.437 -2.023* -1.757
(1.973) (2.025) (1.072) (1.516)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.849 0.822 0.804 0.712
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and
Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: popu-
lation density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expen-
diture, and FDI.
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Table 12: The Effects of Neighboring Megacities (with Distance to Border)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2000 -0.223* -0.184 -0.247** -0.0249
(0.117) (0.121) (0.0953) (0.0820)
Downwind × Post2000 1.705 1.368 2.317*** -0.207
(1.115) (1.162) (0.764) (0.675)
Distance Border × Post2000 -0.0708 -0.0621 0.0343 -0.0565
(0.0526) (0.0449) (0.0535) (0.0444)
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2003 -0.688* -0.645* -0.597* -0.0780
(0.352) (0.348) (0.310) (0.266)
Downwind × Post2003 5.006* 4.696* 6.699** -0.186
(2.668) (2.698) (2.534) (1.927)
Distance Border × Post2003 -0.0638 -0.0400 0.334* -0.176
(0.169) (0.173) (0.174) (0.208)
Near Megacity 4.087** 3.718** 2.664 1.647
(1.721) (1.753) (1.745) (1.508)
Near Megacity × Post2000 -0.434 -0.645 0.221 -0.392
(0.832) (0.821) (0.726) (0.497)
Near Megacity × Post2003 -4.003* -3.410 -2.189* -1.631
(1.998) (2.059) (1.078) (1.518)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.849 0.822 0.805 0.713
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are lagged
by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of
secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 13: The Effects of Neighboring Megacities Before 2000 (with Distance to Border)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2000 -0.206* -0.163 -0.247** -0.0146
(0.115) (0.115) (0.0984) (0.0757)
Downwind × Post2000 1.635* 1.269 2.334*** -0.258
(0.960) (1.006) (0.700) (0.615)
Distance Border × Post2000 -0.0525 -0.0477 0.0504 -0.0511
(0.0478) (0.0393) (0.0480) (0.0451)
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2003 -0.680* -0.647* -0.595* -0.0802
(0.368) (0.363) (0.305) (0.274)
Downwind × Post2003 4.727 4.489 6.507** -0.269
(2.861) (2.861) (2.493) (1.951)
Distance Border × Post2003 -0.104 -0.0754 0.311* -0.193
(0.165) (0.168) (0.177) (0.208)
Near Initial Megacity × Post2000 -0.694 -0.732 -0.284 -0.418
(0.462) (0.449) (0.418) (0.344)
Near Initial Megacity × Post2003 -4.274** -4.004** -2.906** -1.853
(1.846) (1.843) (1.257) (1.576)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.849 0.822 0.805 0.713
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are lagged
by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of
secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 14: Estimations on the Output in Polluting Industries of Air Pollutants (with Non-polluting Industries for Robustness
Check)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Output Non Output Non1 Output Non2 Output Non3 Output Non4
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2000 0.0458 0.144 0.0150 -0.128 0.0140
(0.252) (0.163) (0.0205) (0.0914) (0.110)
Downwind × Post2000 -1.060 -0.657 -0.0726 0.458 -0.788
(1.442) (0.692) (0.139) (0.835) (0.739)
Distance Border × Post2000 0.0927 -0.00505 0.0136 0.0608 0.0233
(0.103) (0.0347) (0.0128) (0.0400) (0.0999)
Distance Border × Downwind × Post2003 0.443 0.917 -0.00525 -0.392 -0.0768
(0.520) (0.602) (0.0481) (0.361) (0.228)
Downwind × Post2003 -4.478 -3.096 0.303 -0.489 -1.195
(4.554) (2.961) (0.448) (2.462) (1.738)
Distance Border × Post2003 0.153 0.00900 0.0747 0.240 -0.171
(0.361) (0.133) (0.0442) (0.167) (0.248)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
R-squared 0.940 0.596 0.787 0.871 0.863
Number of cities 286 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3)
Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of secondary
industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
47
Table 15: Robustness Checks (Distance to Border < 80km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Post2000 1.249 1.150 1.246* 0.141
(0.849) (0.855) (0.635) (0.581)
Downwind × Post2003 3.056** 2.788** 4.161*** 0.103
(1.403) (1.334) (1.427) (0.819)
Population 0.0737* 0.0692 0.0616*** 0.0219
(0.0416) (0.0464) (0.0207) (0.0262)
Industrial Output 0.337*** 0.313*** 0.199*** 0.184***
(0.0207) (0.0229) (0.0156) (0.0234)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
R-squared 0.869 0.854 0.825 0.745
Number of cities 177 177 177 177
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4)
Population and Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other
control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry,
share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 16: Triple-differences Estimation with Wind Speed (Distance to Border < 80km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2000 0.106 0.0100 0.252 -0.120
(0.158) (0.166) (0.176) (0.132)
Downwind × Post2000 0.111 1.065 -1.508 1.470
(1.464) (1.574) (1.796) (1.350)
Wind Speed × Post2000 -0.0565 -0.00481 -0.0384 -0.0197
(0.138) (0.145) (0.120) (0.136)
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2003 0.752** 0.434 0.903*** -0.177
(0.311) (0.319) (0.280) (0.327)
Downwind × Post2003 -5.347 -2.108 -5.679** 1.836
(3.224) (3.573) (2.627) (3.723)
Wind Speed × Post2003 -0.897 -0.645 -0.491** -0.381
(0.580) (0.675) (0.182) (0.659)
Population 0.0737* 0.0694 0.0605*** 0.0229
(0.0424) (0.0472) (0.0201) (0.0274)
Industrial Output 0.339*** 0.315*** 0.201*** 0.185***
(0.0211) (0.0236) (0.0151) (0.0242)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
R-squared 0.870 0.854 0.827 0.747
Number of cities 177 177 177 177
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output
are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita
GDP, share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
49
Table 17: Triple-differences Estimation with Standard Deviation of Wind Direction (Distance to Border < 80km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2000 -0.0189 -0.0231 -0.0102 -0.0141
(0.0224) (0.0219) (0.0182) (0.0136)
Downwind× Post2000 2.423 2.574 1.859 1.018
(1.441) (1.547) (1.357) (0.844)
Direction Std × Post2000 0.00395 0.00400 5.26e-05 0.000939
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0111) (0.00862)
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2003 -0.0710 -0.0659 -0.0762 -0.0177
(0.0489) (0.0474) (0.0526) (0.0392)
Downwind× Post2003 7.179 6.595 8.852** 0.925
(4.261) (4.127) (4.035) (2.615)
Direction Std × Post2003 -0.0485 -0.0518 0.0319 -0.0774
(0.0862) (0.0926) (0.0405) (0.0806)
Population 0.0720* 0.0675 0.0615*** 0.0200
(0.0408) (0.0456) (0.0205) (0.0253)
Industrial Output 0.337*** 0.313*** 0.199*** 0.184***
(0.0203) (0.0226) (0.0157) (0.0231)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
R-squared 0.871 0.856 0.826 0.749
Number of cities 177 177 177 177
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *
at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are
lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP,
share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 18: Robustness Checks (Distance to Border < 60km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Post2000 1.397 1.086 1.640* 0.0398
(0.942) (0.955) (0.816) (0.567)
Downwind × Post2003 4.011** 3.668* 4.208** 0.756
(1.859) (1.794) (1.919) (0.909)
Population 0.0956 0.0886 0.0682** 0.0339
(0.0568) (0.0627) (0.0323) (0.0344)
Industrial Output 0.333*** 0.311*** 0.188*** 0.188***
(0.0216) (0.0243) (0.0118) (0.0253)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,102
R-squared 0.881 0.862 0.858 0.762
Number of cities 135 135 135 135
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4)
Population and Industrial Output are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other
control variables include: population density, per capita GDP, share of secondary industry,
share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 19: Triple-differences Estimation with Wind Speed (Distance to Border < 60km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2000 0.279 0.201 0.352 -0.0726
(0.237) (0.244) (0.222) (0.153)
Downwind× Post2000 -1.559 -1.032 -2.084 0.800
(2.106) (2.141) (2.022) (1.397)
Wind Speed × Post2000 -0.163 -0.111 -0.127 -0.0372
(0.188) (0.200) (0.121) (0.164)
Downwind × Wind Speed × Post2003 1.039** 0.577 1.108** -0.118
(0.379) (0.477) (0.412) (0.498)
Downwind× Post2003 -7.389** -2.805 -7.569** 1.641
(3.503) (5.041) (3.577) (5.386)
Wind Speed × Post2003 -1.078 -0.837 -0.513** -0.572
(0.752) (0.877) (0.247) (0.857)
Population 0.0946 0.0883 0.0666** 0.0347
(0.0573) (0.0635) (0.0313) (0.0353)
Industrial Output 0.337*** 0.314*** 0.190*** 0.190***
(0.0225) (0.0256) (0.0114) (0.0265)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,102
R-squared 0.883 0.863 0.860 0.765
Number of cities 135 135 135 135
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output
are lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita
GDP, share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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Table 20: Triple-differences Estimation with Standard Deviation of Wind Direction (Distance to Border < 60km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot Output Dust
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2000 -0.0216 -0.0266 -0.0118 -0.0110
(0.0248) (0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0179)
Downwind × Post2000 2.595 2.564 2.299 0.611
(1.552) (1.556) (1.828) (1.078)
Direction Std × Post2000 -0.00332 -0.00371 0.000485 -0.00843
(0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0104)
Downwind × Direction Std × Post2003 -0.0331 -0.0350 -0.0558 0.0128
(0.0629) (0.0640) (0.0490) (0.0549)
Downwind × Post2003 5.332 5.102 7.425* -0.656
(4.874) (5.140) (3.758) (3.553)
Direction Std × Post2003 -0.108 -0.107 -0.00291 -0.121
(0.101) (0.115) (0.0314) (0.106)
Population 0.0942 0.0872 0.0680** 0.0326
(0.0560) (0.0622) (0.0319) (0.0341)
Industrial Output 0.332*** 0.310*** 0.187*** 0.187***
(0.0209) (0.0236) (0.0118) (0.0248)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,102
R-squared 0.884 0.866 0.859 0.769
Number of cities 135 135 135 135
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *
at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at province level. (4) Population and Industrial Output are
lagged by 1 year to control endogeneity. (5) Other control variables include: population density, per capita GDP,
share of secondary industry, share of tertiary industry, government expenditure, and FDI.
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3.0 TRANS-BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL
RELOCATION: A MODEL FOR THE EFFECTS ON NON-POLLUTING
INDUSTRIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
China’s large-scale policy-change of environmental regulation in the early 2000s has caused
a severe problem of trans-boundary pollution under its decentralized environmental man-
agement system. China’s provincial capitals began locating more highly polluting industries
in downwind cities near provincial borders than in other cities after the central government
began to implement stricter environmental regulation in 2003. This type of policy-induced
trans-boundary air pollution is associated with negative influences on health, employment,
and output in cities near provincial borders. These effects are exogenous to the non-polluting
industrial sectors in cities near the upwind side of provincial borders, where more likely to
receive air pollution from its upwind neighboring province. Therefore, it provides an oppor-
tunity to study the cost of air pollution, through estimating the effects of policy-induced
trans-boundary air pollution on non-polluting industries in cities near provincial borders. In
this chapter, I analyze the effect of policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution on industrial
relocation in a model, and predictions from the comparative statics in this model will become
the foundation for empirical analysis in next chapter.
The fast growth of highly polluting industries in China during the period of economic
take-off has caused severe air pollution problems (Bi et al., 2007). Higher pollution is asso-
ciated with higher mortality, worse health, and lower output (Matus et al., 2012; Chen et
al., 2013), and the total monetary value of health losses caused by air pollution in China is
estimated at 3.8% of GDP according to a survey by World Bank (2007). China’s inabili-
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ty to effectively control pollution stems in part from its decentralized regulatory structure:
pollution in China is not regulated by a single, federal authority, but rather by a multitude
of provincial governments (Cai et al., 2016)). Provincial governments under-provide pollu-
tion abatement because they do not bear the full cost of pollution generated within their
borders. When subnational governments are by law required to reduce pollution in their
territory, they have incentives to dump pollution on their neighbors, causing the problem of
trans-boundary pollution (Oates, 1999, 2002). Specifically for the case air-pollution, subna-
tional governments have incentives to set up factories and enterprises downwind from where
their constituents live and on borders with neighboring jurisdictions. Through free riding on
trans-boundary air pollution, they can enjoy more employment and economic growth from
polluting industries, while dumping pollution on their downwind neighbors.
The problem of trans-boundary pollution has become much more significant since Chi-
na’s central government began to implement stricter environmental regulation when there
had been fierce political competition among provincial leaders under a combination of cen-
trally controlled political governance and decentralized socio-economic governance in modern
China. China’s central government has launched a large-scale policy-change to fight against
environmental pollution since the early 2000s. This new regime of environmental policies
includes targets to reduce pollution emissions, stricter laws on monitoring and punishing
polluters, and changes to the criteria of evaluating local officials’ performances (Landry,
2008; Cai et al., 2016). However, since China’s current political system is a combination of
centrally controlled political governance and decentralized economic governance, provincial
and local governors are motivated to focus on their local outcomes and to compete with each
other for promotion (Qian et al., 1999; Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). It is high-level govern-
ment officials in the provincial capital that shape industrial location policy in each province,
and they are affected by the policy change. When central government’s policy-change made
local environmental quality more important to the promotion of officials, those local leaders
received stronger incentives to free ride on trans-boundary environmental pollution, and the
polluting industries have thus increased in downwind cities near provincial borders. There-
fore, much of the cost of pollution in a given province, say province A, is borne by the
residents of adjacent provinces that are downwind of polluting industry sites in province A.
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While the introduction of polluting industries in province A creates more employment and
growth in A, it also increases trans-boundary air pollution, which in turn generates adverse
health, employment, and output effects in non-polluting industries in neighboring provinces.
In this chapter, I use a theoretical model to analyze the strategic responses of provin-
cial leaders given the central government’s policy change. Each province in this model has
two cities with a constant wind direction, and provincial government allocates output levels
of polluting and non-polluting industries across the two cities. Cost of production in the
non-polluting industry in each city is affected by the amount of pollution from its upwind
neighbor. There is a central government that decides political promotion of provincial lead-
ers, and it evaluates performances of provincial leaders according to a weighted sum of total
economic surplus and total environmental pollution. This evaluation function becomes the
objective function in provincial leaders’ decision problem, and Nash equilibrium of political
leaders’ competition is solved in the model. The patterns of industrial relocation caused by
trans-boundary air pollution are characterized by comparative statics of the model. When
labor markets are connected across cities within each province, if the central government in-
creases the weight of pollution in its evaluation function, the policy-change will cause more
output and employment of polluting industry in the downwind city in each province, which
implies there is more trans-boundary pollution. This will lead to less output and employment
of non-polluting industry in the upwind city, and more of which in downwind city in each
province. Total social welfare of the economy is less than the social planner’s solution. The
distortions are greater when the central government cares more about environmental pollu-
tion and imposes greater regulatory pressures. The predictions from the model will guide
empirical analysis in the next chapter about the costs of policy-induced trans-boundary air
pollution in China.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the assump-
tions and model settings. Section 3.3 reports the equilibrium results and implications of
the model. Section 3.4 reports the analysis of the model that labor is mobile across cities.
Section 3.5 concludes. Section 3.6 includes the figures.
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3.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND MODEL SETTINGS
The analytical framework is a model for a province with two cities (up, down). The province
is located in a circle of many provinces, with a constant wind direction as shown in Figure
7. Since all provinces are identical, the analysis will focus on one representative province.
Each province has 2 cities up and down, and industrial production can take place in both
cities. City up is located near the upwind side of the provincial border, while city down
is located near the downwind side. The provincial government will decide output levels
of industrial production in both cities. There are two types of industries: “dirty” and
”clean”, and the amount of pollution emission in each city is associated with the output
level of dirty industry. There is a central government that decides political turnover of
provincial leaders, according to an objective function consisting of both levels of industrial
output and environmental pollution, and the relative weights of output and pollution can
be different when the central government implements different policies. Given the central
government’s policy (characterized by parameters in objective function), provincial leaders
will make decisions to maximize their probability of being promoted, and their competition
leads to a Nash equilibrium in the model. I will solve comparative statics for equilibria
under different policies of central government. In this section, I will introduce and discuss
the setting and assumptions of the model at first.
3.2.1 Production Function and Cost Function
There are two different sectors or industries in this economy. One sector has air pollution
emission, and it is called “dirty” industry (denoted as a superscript “d”). The level of air
pollution is a function of output in dirty industry. The other sector does not pollute the air,
and it is called “clean” industry (denoted as a superscript “c”). Production functions are
different for the two sectors. I assume that only productivity of clean industry is affected
by pollution, because impact from pollution is relatively larger for clean industries like food
and beverage production, medical and pharmaceutical products, and electronic appliances
manufacturing, compared with dirty sectors like power production, petroleum fuel process-
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ing, and metals smelting and pressing. For simplicity, I assume that the production function
of clean industry has a term of negative effects from pollution. This term can be considered
as a relative measure for the effect of pollution on the productivity of clean industry, being
normalized by the relatively small effect of pollution on dirty industry. Here I assume a pro-
duction function that has only one factor of production called “labor”, and this Ricardian
form of production function will make the cost of production become a function of output
level. Hence, the decision variables in the provincial government’s maximization problem
will be output levels in different sectors and cities only, which are convenient for character-
izing and analyzing decisions of provincial governments on industrial production. I assume
production functions to be constant return to scale. The production function for the dirty
industry in city i is assumed to be:
qdi = L
d
i
Assume unit wage is wdi , from the cost minimization problem shown in Appendix A.1,
the cost function for the dirty industry in city i is derived as:
cd(qdi ) = w
d
i q
d
i
The production function for the clean industry in city i is:
qci =
Lci
γP−i + 1
where P−i is pollution from upwind city −i, and γ ≥ 0 represents negative production
externalities. When γ = 0 or P−i = 0, we have qci = L
c
i . This result means that when
γ = 0, production of clean industry is not affected by air pollution. When γ is larger, the
negative effects of air pollution on the production of clean industry is larger. From the cost
minimization problem shown in Appendix A.1, the cost function for the clean industry in
city i is derived as:
cc(qci ) = w
c
i (γP−i + 1)q
c
i
It is increasing in negative externality of pollution from the upwind city −i.
58
3.2.2 Assumptions: Trans-boundary Pollution and Labor Markets
In order to characterize trans-boundary air pollution and its consequences, I assume that
pollution externalities can only affect the next city in downwind direction, so production in
city down is affected by pollution in city up (Pup), and production in city up is affected by
pollution in city down of the upwind province (Pdown(−i)). For simplicity, I also assume that
the amount of pollution is equal to the amount of output in the dirty industry.
Assumption 1.
Pdown(−i) = qddown(−i)
Pup = q
d
up
Under this assumption, the cost functions for the clean industry in cities up and down
will become:
cc(qcup) = w
c
up(γq
d
down(−i) + 1)q
c
up
cc(qcdown) = w
c
down(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
down
The negative externalities of air pollution are characterized as increasing cost of produc-
tion in the clean industry. When there are negative production externalities (γ > 0), the cost
of production of the clean industry in city up is increasing in pollution from city down(−i),
and the cost of production in the clean industry in city down is increasing in city up.
For labor markets, I have the following important assumptions:
Assumption 2. Labor markets are monopsonistic and labor supply functions are linear
in wage:
Ldup = w
d
up, L
d
down = w
d
down
Lcup = w
c
up, L
c
down = w
c
down
Assumption 3. Labor markets are segmented in each city and each industry.
This assumption is for the baseline analysis. There are four segmented labor markets in
each province: dirty industry in city up, dirty industry in city down, clean industry in city
up, and clean industry in city down. In the monopsonistic labor market equilibrium, wage
of the dirty industry is determined by:
wdup = L
d
up = q
d
up, w
d
down = L
d
down = q
d
down
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Wage for the clean industry is determined by:
wcup = L
c
up = (γq
d
down(−i) + 1)q
c
up, w
c
down = L
c
down = (γq
d
up + 1)q
c
down
Therefore, cost functions for both industries and cities become:
cd(qdup) = w
d
upL
d
up = (q
d
up)
2
cd(qddown) = w
d
downL
d
down = (q
d
down)
2
cc(qcup) = w
c
upL
c
up = (γq
d
down(−i) + 1)
2(qcup)
2
cc(qcdown) = w
c
downL
c
down = (γq
d
up + 1)
2(qcdown)
2
The comparative statics of the model under this assumption will be solved and dis-
cussed in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, this assumption will be relaxed and I will consider an
alternative assumption that labor market is connected between cities within a province.
In order to calculate economic surplus in each province, I have the following important
assumption:
Assumption 4. Product markets are competitive and prices of “dirty” product (pd)
and “clean” product (pd) are exogenously determined in global markets.
This assumption is a reasonable assumption because China has been an export-oriented
economy since the economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s.
3.2.3 Decision Problem of Provincial Government
The decision problem of provincial government is according to the objective function that
central government uses to evaluate performances of provincial leaders. It is a weighted sum
of total economic surplus and environmental pollution being monitored in each province.
The provincial government will choose quantities of output qdup, q
c
up, q
d
down, and q
c
down to
maximize their probability of being promoted, which is according to the evaluation function.
The relative weights of economic surplus and environmental pollution are set by the central
government, and the decision problem of provincial government can be considered as in the
following two different cases.
Case 1: Negative production externalities (γ ≥ 0), but no regulatory pressure (φ = 0).
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In this case, central government does not care about environmental pollution, which is
similar to the situation during periods of China’s early economic development from the late
1970s to 1990s. The central government used GDP growth as a major indicator for evaluating
the performances of provincial leaders, and provincial leaders competed in GDP growth for
being promoted at that time (Qian et al., 1999; Li and Zhou, 2005). This type of GDP
competition is modeled as the following objective function of a provincial government, which
is the sum of economic surplus in two industries and two cities in that province. Employment
is not directly included in the objective function, but it is highly correlated with economic
output because the production functions are Ricardian in this model. In reality, subnational
governments in China can achieve more employment by using the revenue from GDP growth
to hire more workers in the state-owned sectors1.
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
+pdqddown − (qddown)2 + pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2
Given the value of parameter γ, and other provinces’ strategy qddown(−i), best response
functions of provincial government are solved by the first-order conditions of this decision
problem in Appendix A.3.1.
Case 2: Negative production externalities (γ > 0), and positive regulatory pressures
(φ > 0).
In this case, the central government includes environmental pollution when evaluating
performances of provincial leaders, and φ > 0 becomes the regulatory pressures for provin-
cial governments. The promotion of provincial leaders depends on both economic growth
(aggregate surplus) and environmental pollution. This is similar to the situation after policy
changes that central government began to implement stricter environmental regulation in the
early 2000s. The Tenth Five-Year Plan adopted in 2000 set specific targets to reduce major
water and air pollutants for the first time in history, and the laws to monitor and punish
offenders for environmental pollution were amended and became effective in the middle of
2003, which has since required stricter environmental regulations. Moreover, there have been
1A more flexible setting of the objective functions, for analysis of employment and wage, will be considered
in the future research.
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more indicators of environmental quality in the explicit performance criteria of provincial
and local officials, including air pollution level (Landry, 2008). Under this new regime of en-
vironmental policies, central government uses both GDP growth and environmental quality
to evaluate performances of provincial leaders and determine their promotion. Therefore,
the objective function becomes the following one, which includes φ ≥ 0 as the regulatory
pressures.
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
−φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2 + pcqcdown
−(γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
Given the value of parameter γ, and other provinces’ strategy qddown(−i), the best responses
of a provincial government are solved by the first-order conditions of this decision problem
in Appendix A.4.1.
3.3 EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The equilibrium condition comes from the symmetric pattern that every province is located
in a circle of identical provinces, with a constant wind direction as shown in Figure 7. Since
all provinces are identical, the equilibrium output level qddown should be equal for all provinces.
Therefore, we have the following condition for solving equilibrium:
Proposition 1. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of trans-boundary pollution satisfies
qddown = q
d
down(−i)
for all provinces.
This proposition shows the condition for solving the Nash equilibrium in both cases of
the model. For Case 1, the system of equations solving equilibrium outputs qd∗up, q
d∗
down, q
c∗
up,
and qc∗down are derived in Appendix A.3.2, through combining this equilibrium condition and
first-order conditions in Appendix A.3.1. We can also solve for the social planner’s solutions
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(qdsup, q
ds
down, q
cs
up, and q
cs
down) by the system of equations derived in Appendix A.3.3, as the
social planner’s problem can be defined as including qddown(−i) = q
d
down in objective function
of representative province. The comparative statics with respect to parameter γ are then
summarized in the following propositions. When there is negative effect of pollution on
productivity (γ ≥ 0), but the central government does not care about pollution (φ = 0), we
have the following results.
Proposition 2. When the central government does not care about environmental pol-
lution (φ = 0), we have:
(i) If there is no negative production externality (γ = 0), the equilibrium outputs and
employments in both industries and cities are all equal to the social planner’s solutions.
(ii) If γ > 0, the upwind equilibrium output and employment of the dirty industry
are always equal to the social planner’s solutions, and downwind equilibrium output and
employment of the clean industry are also always equal to the social planner’s solutions.
(iii) If γ > 0, the downwind equilibrium output and employment of the dirty industry
are always greater than the social planner’s solutions.
(iv) If γ > 0, the upwind equilibrium output and employment of the clean industry are
always less than the social planner’s solutions.
Proposition 3. When the central government does not care about environmental pol-
lution (φ = 0), and if negative production externality (γ) is increasing:
(i) Dirty industries: The upwind equilibrium output and employment are decreasing,
and the downwind equilibrium output and employment are constant. The gaps between
equilibrium and social planner’s solutions are increasing in the downwind city.
(ii) Clean industries: The upwind equilibrium output and employment are decreasing,
and the downwind equilibrium output and employment are also decreasing. The gaps be-
tween equilibrium and social planner’s solutions are increasing in the upwind city.
These propositions imply that without intervention from the central government, provin-
cial leaders will have stronger incentives to free ride on trans-boundary air pollution when
the negative effect of pollution on productivity is stronger. While the gap between qd∗down and
its social planner’s solution is increasing in γ, which means there is more trans-boundary air
pollution relative to the social planner’s solution when γ is larger, employment and output
63
of clean industry in the upwind city are decreasing in γ: negative impact of trans-boundary
pollution on employment and output in non-polluting sector is stronger when γ is larger.
Meanwhile, although qc∗down is also decreasing in γ, it does not deviate from its social plan-
ner’s solution. Combined with the pattern that qc∗up is below its social planner’s solution
when γ > 0 and the gap is larger when γ is larger, these results imply that clean industry
is more likely to move from the upwind city to the downwind city when trans-boundary air
pollution is larger as γ is larger. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the results of Propositions 2 and
3. The dashed lines are the social planner’s solutions, and the solid lines are equilibrium
solutions.
For Case 2, the objective function includes a parameter φ ≥ 0, which is the weight
that central government set for environmental pollution when evaluating the performance of
provincial leaders. φ represents the regulatory pressures for provincial leaders. The large-
scale policy change from 2003, which is used as a natural experiment in empirical analysis,
is modeled as a sharp increase of φ. Therefore, the empirical analysis in the next chapter
will be guided by the predictions from the comparative statics with respect to parameter φ.
The system of equations solving equilibrium outputs qd∗up, q
d∗
down, q
c∗
up, and q
c∗
down in this case
are derived in Appendix A.4. When there is negative production externality (γ > 0), and
there regulatory pressures (φ > 0) , we have the following results.
Proposition 4. Provincial government (equilibrium) versus social planner’s outcomes
for segmented labor markets.
If there are negative production externalities (γ > 0) and regulatory pressures (φ > 0),
then:
(i) Dirty industries: The upwind equilibrium employment and output are the same as
the social planner’s solution. However, the downwind equilibrium employment and output
are greater.
(ii) Clean industries: The upwind equilibrium employment and output are less than the
social planner’s solution. However, the downwind levels are the same.
Proposition 5. The impact of regulatory pressures in segmented labor markets.
If γ > 0 and φ > 0, then as regulatory pressures increase, the economy becomes more
distorted for two reasons:
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(i) The gaps between the equilibrium outputs (employments) for the provincial govern-
ments versus social planner increase in the downwind city for the dirty industry.
(ii) These gaps in absolute terms increase in the upwind city for the clean industry.
The results in Propositions 4(i) and 5(i) are consistent with my findings of policy-induced
trans-boundary air pollution in Chapter 2. China’s provincial capitals began locating more
highly-polluting industries in downwind cities near provincial borders than in all other types
of cities, after the central government began to implement stricter environmental regulation
in 2003. The results in Propositions 4(ii) and 5(ii) have important implications for the
empirical analysis of the impact of trans-boundary pollution on non-polluting industries.
When regulatory pressures (φ) are largely increased by central government’s policy change,
the model predicts that the output and employment of the clean industry in the upwind city
will be less than the social planner’s solutions, and the gaps are larger. Figures 10 and 11
illustrate numerical results for Propositions 4 and 5 when assuming γ = 0.5. The dashed
lines are the social planner’s solutions, and the solid lines are equilibrium solutions.
Next, the following proposition conclude losses of social welfare for the whole economy
due to policy-induced trans-boundary pollution.
Proposition 6. When there are negative production externalities (γ > 0), and if the
regulatory pressures (φ) are increasing: the total welfare of this economy is less than the
social planner’s solution, and the gap increases.
This proposition predicts economic and welfare losses from the policy-induced trans-
boundary air pollution under China’s regionally decentralized environmental management.
When environmental regulation is stricter, distortion from free-riding on trans-boundary
pollution is larger, and losses of social welfare are larger. This is an explanation for the fact
in China that environmental pollution is still getting worse when the central government
has implemented stricter environmental regulation in recent years. Figures 12 illustrates
numerical results for Propositions 6 when assuming γ = 0.5. The dashed lines are the social
planner’s solutions, and the solid lines are equilibrium solutions.
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL THAT LABOR MARKETS ARE
CONNECTED
In the alternative model setting, I assume that labor markets are connected within each
industry. There are now two labor markets: industry “dirty” and “clean”. Wage is increasing
in total labor demand in each labor market.
In the monopsonistic labor market equilibrium, wage for industry “dirty” is now given
by:
wdup = L
d
up + αL
d
down = q
d
up + αq
d
down
wddown = αL
d
up + L
d
down = αq
d
up + q
d
down
The parameter α represents the degree of mobility of labor across two cities (0 < α < 1).
Wage for industry “clean” is given by:
wcup = L
c
up + αL
c
down = (γq
d
down(−i) + 1)q
c
up + α(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
down
wcdown = αL
c
up + L
c
down = α(γq
d
down(−i) + 1)q
c
up + α(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
down
Therefore, cost functions for both industries and cities are:
cd(qdup) = wupL
d
up = (q
d
up)
2 + αqddownq
d
up
cd(qddown) = wdownL
d
down = (q
d
down)
2 + αqddownq
d
up
cc(qcup) = wupL
c
up = (γq
d
down(−i) + 1)
2(qcup)
2 + α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
upq
c
down
cc(qcdown) = wdownL
c
down = (γq
d
up + 1)
2(qcdown)
2 + (γqddown(−i) + 1)(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
upq
c
down
The decision problem of provincial governments will become the following one under the
above assumptions:
max pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2 − αqddownqdup
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
−φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
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The model is solved in Appendix B, and the following propositions summarize the findings
in this model.
Proposition 7. Provincial government (equilibrium) versus social planner’s outcomes
for connected labor markets.
If γ > 0 and φ > 0, then:
(i) Dirty industries: The upwind equilibrium employment and output are less than the so-
cial planner’s solution. And, the downwind equilibrium employment and output are greater.
(ii) Clean industries: The upwind equilibrium employment and output are less than the
social planner’s solution. And, the downwind levels are greater.
Proposition 8. The impact of regulatory pressures in connected labor markets.
If γ > 0 and φ > 0, then as regulatory pressures increase:
(i) Dirty industries: The downwind equilibrium output and employment of the dirty
industry are increasing in φ.
(ii) Clean industries: The upwind equilibrium output and employment of the clean in-
dustry are decreasing in φ.
(iii) The economy becomes more distorted because all gaps for outputs (employments)
between equilibrium and social planner’s solutions increase in absolute terms.
The results in Proposition 7(i) are consistent with my findings of policy-induced trans-
boundary air pollution in the empirical analysis of Chapter 2. When labor markets are
connected across cities, the results in Propositions 7(ii) and 8 have important implications
for empirical analysis about the impact of trans-boundary pollution on the non-polluting in-
dustries. When labor markets are connected, if regulatory pressures (φ) are largely increased
by central government’s policy change, the model predicts that the output and employment of
clean industry in the upwind city will be less, and which in the downwind city will be greater.
Policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution has negative effects on the non-polluting sector
in the upwind city, and non-polluting industries are more likely to move from the upwind city
to the downwind city after the policy change. These results are different from the segmented
labor markets in Section 3.3 and suggest that there are more distortions of trans-boundary
pollution when labor markets are connected. Since the economic reforms began in the late
1970s, labor mobility within province has been less restricted in China. Labor mobility is
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freer within each province, especially for the urban population. The prediction of Proposi-
tion 8 is that clean industries in the cities receiving trans-boundary pollution will have less
output and employment after the policy change. For the empirical analysis of next chapter,
I will use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to test whether output, number of firms,
and employment of non-polluting industries in upwind cities near provincial borders are neg-
atively affected by the policy-induced trans-boundary pollution. Figures 13 and 14 illustrate
numerical results for Propositions 7 and 8 when assuming γ = 0.5 and α = 0.3. The dashed
lines are the social planner’s solutions, and the solid lines are equilibrium solutions.
Finally, the following proposition concludes losses of social welfare for the whole economy
due to policy-induced trans-boundary pollution:
Proposition 9. When labor markets are connected across cities within a province,
and there are negative production externalities (γ > 0), if the regulatory pressures (φ) are
increasing: the total welfare of this economy is less than the social planner’s solution, and
the gap increases.
This proposition does not change the findings in Proposition 6 for which labor markets
are assumed to be segmented. Figure 15 illustrates numerical results for Propositions 9 when
assuming γ = 0.5 and α = 0.3. The dashed lines are the social planner’s solutions, and the
solid lines are equilibrium solutions.
3.5 CONCLUSION
The patterns of industrial relocation caused by policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution
in China are characterized by the comparative statics of the model in this chapter. When
the central government increases the weight of pollution in its evaluation function, there
is more output and employment of polluting industry in downwind city in each province,
which implies more trans-boundary air pollution. This will lead to relatively less output
and employment of non-polluting industry in the upwind city. The total social welfare of
the economy is below the social planner’s solution, and gaps are larger when the central
government imposes greater regulatory pressures. The results are consistent with the fact
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that trans-boundary air pollution has become worse since the large-scale policy changes made
by the central government in the early 2000s.
The wind patterns and institutional features in modern China provide a unique quasi-
experimental setting for studying the impacts of trans-boundary air pollution. The theoreti-
cal model in this chapter will become the foundation for analyzing the costs of trans-boundary
air pollution in China, and the predictions from the model will guide empirical analysis in the
next chapter. I will empirically test whether non-polluting industries in downwind provinces
are harmed by the increased trans-boundary pollution from upwind provinces due to the
policy changes of 2003. Specifically, I will test the effects of policy-induced trans-boundary
pollution on output, number of firms, and employment in non-polluting industries in cities
near other provinces to the upwind direction. The empirical analysis guided by the model
predictions will contribute to the literature about estimating the economic costs of environ-
mental pollution. The findings will also have implications for designing and improving public
policies of reducing environmental pollution in China effectively.
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3.6 FIGURES
Figure 7: A Circle of Provinces
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Figure 8: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Outputs with Parameter γ (Model 1)
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Figure 9: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Employments with Parameter γ (Model 1)
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Figure 10: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Outputs with Parameter φ (Model 1)
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Figure 11: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Employments with Parameter φ (Model 1)
Figure 12: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Social Welfare with Parameter φ (Model 1)
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Figure 13: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Outputs with Parameter φ (Model 2)
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Figure 14: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Employments with Parameter φ (Model 2)
Figure 15: Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Social Welfare with Parameter φ (Model 2)
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4.0 THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRANS-BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION
IN CHINA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON
NON-POLLUTING INDUSTRIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Trans-boundary air pollution is a major inefficiency of decentralized environmental man-
agement. However, it is difficult to assess the exact cost of trans-boundary pollution, as
geographic distribution of polluting industries and intensity of pollution emissions are en-
dogenous to local social and economic characteristics. The policy-induced trans-boundary air
pollution in modern China provides an opportunity to estimate the cost of trans-boundary
air pollution in a scientific way. Since the 1990s, severe air pollution has become a lasting
and challenging social problem in China, as the growing economy of this country is heavily
based on consumption of fossil fuels like coal and oil (Bi et al., 2007; Rawski, 2009; Chen et
al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter 2, the central government of China launched a large-scale
policy-change in the early 2000s in order to implement stricter environmental regulation, but
it has caused a dramatic increase of trans-boundary air pollution across provincial border-
s, due to the decentralized environmental management in China. This increase of trans-
boundary air pollution is exogenous to non-polluting industrial sectors (“clean industries”)
in cities near provincial borders, which are more likely to be affected by air pollution from
its upwind adjacent province. In this chapter, I will empirically study the consequences
of policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution across China’s provinces. I will particularly
focus on how air pollution from one province affects output, employment, and number of
firms in clean industries in its downwind adjacent provinces.
The institutional features in modern China lead to a unique quasi-experimental setting
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for studying the incidence and impacts of trans-boundary air pollution. China’s inability to
effectively control pollution stems in part from its decentralized regulatory structure. Pol-
lution in China is not regulated by a single federal authority, but rather by a multitude
of provincial governments (Landry, 2008; Cai et al., 2016). Provincial governments under-
provide pollution abatement because they do not bear the full cost of pollution generated
within their borders. When subnational governments are by law required to reduce pollu-
tion in their territory, they have incentives to dump pollution on their neighbors, causing
the problem of trans-boundary pollution (Oates, 1999). In the case of air pollution, it is
well documented that subnational governments set up more polluting industries downwind
from where their constituents live and on borders with neighboring jurisdictions. Through
difference-in-differences estimation using regional wind patterns and a large-scale policy-
change, I have found that China’s provincial capitals began locating more highly-polluting
industries in downwind cities near provincial borders than in all other types of cities af-
ter 2003. Therefore, much of the cost of pollution in a given province, say province A, is
borne by the residents of adjacent provinces that are downwind of polluting industry sites
in province A. Put another way, while the introduction of polluting industries in province
A creates more employment and growth in A, it also increases trans-boundary air pollution,
which in turn generates adverse health, employment, and output effects in clean industries
in adjacent provinces.
The empirical analysis in this chapter is guided by the theoretical model in Chapter
3, which has predicted adverse employment and output effects of trans-boundary pollution
across China’s provinces. Strategic responses of provincial leaders under central government’s
policy-change are solved in the model, and patterns of industrial relocation caused by trans-
boundary air pollution are well characterized in the comparative statics. I have the following
testable predictions: when labor markets are connected within each province, if the central
government increases the weight of pollution in its evaluation function for imposing greater
regulatory pressures, there are more output and employment of polluting industry in the
downwind city in each province, which implies more trans-boundary air pollution. This
will lead to less output and employment of clean industry in the upwind city, and the total
welfare of the economy is below the social planner’s solution. The gas are larger when the
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central government implements stricter environmental regulation.
The empirical strategy is also based on wind patterns of China. From the dataset of
WINDFINDER (2014), I have calculated all-time average dominant wind direction in each
province, and then define which cities are “downwind” according to this. Therefore, down-
wind cities close to provincial borders are “senders” of trans-boundary air pollution. For
analyzing the effects on clean industry, I also figure out which cities are most likely to be
affected by trans-boundary air pollution from their upwind neighboring provinces. Those
cities are “receivers” of trans-boundary air pollution. I empirically estimate whether output
and employment of clean industry firms in “receiver” cities are negatively affected by the
policy-induced trans-boundary pollution, through a difference-in-differences (DID) estima-
tion. I will also estimate whether new firms in clean industries are less likely to locate in
“receiver” cities affected by trans-boundary air pollution.
Through empirical estimations based on the large-scale policy-change and wind patterns,
I provide evidence-based results for the negative effects of policy-induced trans-boundary air
pollution on clean industries. The DID estimations show that trans-boundary air pollution
under China’s decentralized environmental management has significantly negative effects
on clean industries in cities near provincial borders. After 2003, output and employment
of existing firms in clean industries are relatively less in cities receiving trans-boundary
air pollution from neighboring provinces. For all existing firms in the receiver cities, the
total negative effect on output is about 37.3 billion RMB (approximately 5.64 billion U.S.
dollars). The negative effects are relatively larger for the clean industries in cities with
higher average wind speed. State-owned firms of the clean industries in the receiver cities
have more unproductive employment. New firms in clean industries are less likely to be
located in the receiver cities. The probability of new firms in clean industries to be located
in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution is about 1.4% to 1.9% lower after 2003.
My empirical findings also contribute to the literature on estimating the economic costs of
environmental pollution. Hedonic regressions on housing prices have been a typical method
to assess impact and cost of pollution, following the idea and framework in Roback (1982).
For example, Chay and Greenstone (2005) find significantly negative effects of TSP con-
centrations on housing prices through an instrument variable of “nonattainment” counties
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under the Clean Air Act. However, hedonic regressions may not be appropriate for inter-city
comparison of housing prices, if the differences in labor markets and migration across cities
are not well addressed in the analytical framework (Albouy, 2009, 2016). Another approach
to assess the cost of pollution is to directly test “voting with feet” of migration. Banzhaf and
Walsh (2008) directly test the theoretical prediction of “voting with feet” and find evidence
for migration resulted from changing environmental quality. Bayer et al. (2009) estimate the
effects of environmental pollution on household location decision. More recently, some liter-
ature is trying to directly test the effects of pollution on industrial productivity. Hanna and
Oliva (2015) find that work hours were increased after air pollution was reduced in Mexico
City. Hanlon (2016) finds that employment growth of British cities was significantly reduced
by local industrial coal use after the Industrial Revolution. Chang et al. (2016) estimate the
negative effects of air pollution on the productivity of pear packers as indoor workers. In this
chapter, empirical estimation is guided by a model of labor market across cities, and I focus
on output and employment to directly test the economic cost of trans-boundary air pollution
on clean industries. The quasi-experimental approach based on large-scale policy-change and
wind patterns provide convincing estimation for the negative effects of trans-boundary air
pollution on clean industries. My findings also contribute to the analysis of unintended con-
sequences of environmental regulation in China. The negative effects of trans-boundary air
pollution on clean industries in the upwind cities are unintended consequences for the central
government’s regulation policy, as the large-scale policy changes were aimed at increasing the
regulatory pressures. Moreover, the less restricted labor markets in modern China further
strengthened the negative spillover effects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the wind
patterns and institutions in shaping the research design. Section 4.3 reports the data and
econometric specifications. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes.
Section 4.6 includes the figures and tables.
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4.2 INSTITUTIONS, WIND PATTERNS, AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The large-scale policy-change in the early 2000s provides an opportunity to empirically s-
tudy the effects of trans-boundary air pollution on clean industries through a difference-
in-difference (DID) approach. The central government has initiated a new regime of envi-
ronmental management, including targets for reducing pollution emissions, stricter laws on
monitoring and punishing pollution, and changes to the criteria of evaluating local officials’
performances (Landry, 2008; Chen et al., 2013). However, fierce political competition for
promotion always exists among provincial leaders in China, as they are under a combina-
tion of centrally controlled political governance and decentralized socio-economic governance
(Qian et al., 1999; Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). High-level government officials in provincial
capital shape industrial location decision in each province, and they are motivated to free
ride on trans-boundary pollution after the policy change. From comparative statics of the
model in Chapter 3, I have the following testable predictions for the effects of policy-induced
trans-boundary air pollution on clean industries (as shown in Figures 13 and 14).
When labor markets are connected within a province and there are negative produc-
tion externality for clean industries, if the central government imposes greater regulatory
pressures (parameter φ is increasing):
(i) The equilibrium output and employment of the dirty industry in the upwind city are
decreasing, and which in the downwind city are increasing. The gaps between equilibrium
and social planner’s solutions increase.
(ii) The equilibrium output and employment of the clean industry in the upwind city are
decreasing, and which in the downwind city are increasing. The gaps between equilibrium
and socially optimal levels are larger.
I will empirically test this prediction, through an identification strategy is based on wind
patterns. I have clearly identified which cities are “downwind” in each of China’s provinces,
from exploring the WINDFINDER (2014) dataset of wind patterns. It provides worldwide
wind and weather information, which includes data on monthly wind patterns in China’s
30 provinces. I have calculated an all-time average dominant wind direction, an average
wind speed, and a standard deviation of wind direction for each province according to the
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dataset. Figure 2 in Chapter 2 has shown the all-time average dominant wind direction in
every province of China.
“Downwind” cities located close to provincial borders in each province are defined ac-
cording to this figure, and they are the “senders” of trans-boundary air pollution after policy-
change. For analyzing the effects on clean industry, I also figure out which cities are most
likely to be affected by the trans-boundary air pollution from their neighboring provinces.
Those cities are “receivers” of trans-boundary air pollution. Here I take Henan Province,
the most populous province in China, as one example showing how to define sender and
receiver cities for trans-boundary air pollution. Figure 16 shows the location of major cities
in Henan Province. The average dominant wind direction is 95.3◦ in this province, which is
close to the direction of east. The following cities are defined as “sender” (downwind) cities:
Anyang, Hebi, Jiaozuo, Nanyang, Sanmenxia, and Xinyang. The following cities are defined
as “receiver” cities: Puyang, Shangqiu, and Zhoukou. “Sender” and “receiver” cities in all
other provinces are also defined in the same way.
4.3 DATA SOURCE AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
The empirical analysis in this chapter answers the following question. Has policy-induced
trans-boundary air pollution in modern China negatively affected clean industries in cities
located close to provincial borders? If the inefficiencies for clean industries associated with
trans-boundary pollution have increased after the policy changes, the following predictions
can be tested in my empirical analysis. (1) Output and employment in clean industries are
relatively less in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution from upwind provinces. (2)
New firms in clean industries are less likely to locate in cities receiving more trans-boundary
air pollution.
The main data source for industrial output is the firm-level dataset of Annual Survey
of Above-Scale Industrial Firms (National Bureau of Statistics, 1998–2007). Above-scale
industrial firms are those with annual revenues above 5 million RMB (approximately 0.76
million U.S. dollars), and the survey covers all such firms located in 286 major cities from
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1998 to 2007. Similar to the definition of polluting industries for river pollution in Cai et al.
(2016), I define air-polluting industries for each kind of air pollutant according to Report on
the First National Census of Polluting Sources (MEP, 2010). The four kinds of air pollutants
listed in this report are SO2, NO2, dust, and soot. After defining the polluting industries
for those four pollutants, the non-polluting (clean) industries are also defined. Table 2 in
Chapter 2 has summarized the polluting and clean industries.
In my previous analysis about the incidence of trans-boundary air pollution in Chapter 2,
empirical estimation is based on the city-level aggregate measure of polluting intensity. When
the firm-level analysis is available in this chapter, it provides an opportunity to distinguish
the two possible channels of increasing trans-boundary pollution: increasing size of existing
firms in polluting industries, or increasing new firms of polluting industries in downwind
cities. Therefore, as a prelude to the analysis of clean industries, I will estimate the firm-
level outcomes for polluting industries. First, it is an estimation for existing firms in polluting
industries.
Pollutingit = β0 + β1 Downwindi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit (4.1)
The subscript i in Equation (4.1) denotes firm, while t denotes year. Pollutingit denotes
the output of an existing firm in polluting industry. The interaction term between Postt and
Downwindi is the key explanatory variable for estimating the incidence of trans-boundary
pollution. Postt is a dummy variable indicating the time of policy-change. Downwindi is
a dummy variable indicating whether city i is in downwind cities. If the size of polluting
industry firms are increasing in downwind cities after the policy change, the coefficient β1 of
the interaction term Downwindi×Postt is predicted to be positive. X is a set of other control
variables including socioeconomic characteristics that may affect air pollution (population
size, size of industrial output, population density, GDP per capita, industrial structure, the
percentage of government expenditure, and share of foreign investment). The data sources
for control variables are from every year’s China Urban Statistical Yearbook. αi is the firm
fixed effects. γt is the year fixed effects. εit is the random error term.
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The other possible channel for increasing trans-boundary pollution is that new firms of
polluting industries are more likely to choose locations in downwind cities. Therefore, next
I estimate the effects on new firms of polluting industries as follows:
Prob(Downwind)it = β0 + β1 Pollutingi × Postt + Xθ + γt + εit (4.2)
Dependent variable Prob(Downwind)it is the probability of choosing to locate a new
firm in a downwind city. Pollutingi is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in
a polluting industry. If the free-riding incentives affect location choice of new firms, the
coefficient of the interaction term Pollutingi × Postt is predicted to be positive.
Similar to the above two channels of increasing trans-boundary pollution, the effects of
trans-boundary air pollution on clean industries are also through both outcomes of existing
firms and location choices of new firms starting after the policy-change. In order to estimate
the effects through those two different channels, empirical estimations will be conducted for
both the sub-samples of existing firms and new firms. For existing firms, I will estimate the
effects through a DID estimation. The baseline estimation equation is shown in Equation
(4.3) as follows.
Nonpollutingit = β0 +β1 Receiveri×Postt +β2 Senderi×Postt + Xθ+αi + γt + εit (4.3)
The subscript i in Equation (4.3) denotes firm, while t denotes year. Nonpollutingit
denotes the outcomes of an existing firm in clean industries. The dependent variable can
be output or employment of a firm in the clean industry. The interaction term between
Postt and Receiveri is the key explanatory variable for estimating the effects of trans-
boundary pollution on clean industries. I will test whether β1 is significantly negative. Postt
is a dummy variable indicating the time of policy-change. Receiveri is a dummy variable
indicating whether city i is affected by trans-boundary air pollution from upwind provinces,
i.e. whether city i is a “receiver” city of trans-boundary air pollution. Senderi is a dummy
variable indicating whether city i is in downwind cities, i.e. whether city i is a ‘sender” city
of trans-boundary air pollution.
Since wind speed is an important factor affecting trans-boundary air pollution, average
wind speed is added into the estimation to show whether output and employment of clean
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industries are lower in “receiver” cities with higher average wind speed. A DDD estimation
is shown in Equation (4.4) as follows.
Nonpollutingit = β0 + β1 Receiveri × Postt + β2 Wind Speedi × Postt
+β3 Receiveri ×Wind Speedi × Postt + β4 Senderi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(4.4)
Wind Speedi is average wind speed. The coefficient of interaction term Receiveri ×
Wind Speedi × Postt is the DDD estimator for whether negative effect of trans-boundary
pollution is larger in cities with higher wind speed. The hypothetical trans-boundary air
pollution after policy-change predicts a negative sign for β3, which is the parameters of
interest in this regression equation.
Since state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are more likely to be influenced by pref-
erences and decisions of government, and foreign-invested firms are much less likely to be
influenced by government, I will include dummy variables indicating ownership of firms in
Equation (4.5) as follows:
Nonpollutingit = β0 + β1 Receiveri × Postt + β2 Statei × Postt
+β3 Receiveri × Statei × Postt + β4 Foreigni × Postt
+β5 Receiveri × Foreigni × Postt + β6 Senderi × Postt + Xθ + αi + γt + εit
(4.5)
Statei is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a state-owned enterprise,
and Foreigni is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is foreign-invested. Triple-
differences estimators Affectedi × Statei × Postt and Affectedi × Foreigni × Postt are of
interest. Since the state-owned firms are less free to adjust their decision when receiving
more trans-boundary air pollution, the coefficient of Affectedi×Statei×Postt is predicted
to be small or even with a different sign than Affectedi×Postt. On the other hand, foreign-
invested firms are much freer to adjust their decision when receiving more trans-boundary
air pollution, the coefficient of Affectedi × Foreigni × Postt is predicted to be larger.
The policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution can also affect the location choice of
new firms in clean industry. When some cities close to provincial borders are receiving more
air pollution from upwind neighbor province, new firms will be less likely to locate in such
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cities. I will empirically test the effects of trans-boundary air pollution on location choice of
new firms through the following linear probability model in Equation (4.6):
Prob(Receiver)it = β0 + β1 Cleani × Postt + Xθ + γt + εit (4.6)
The dependent variable Prob(Receiver)it is the probability of a new firm being located
in a city receiving trans-boundary air pollution from upwind province, i.e. a receiver city.
Cleani is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is in a clean industry. If the negative
effects of trans-boundary air pollution affect location choice of new firms, the coefficient
of interaction term Cleani × Postt is predicted to be negative. The variables indicating
ownership will be included in Equation (4.7):
Prob(Receiver)it = β0 + β1 Cleani × Postt + β2 Statei × Postt
+β3 Cleani × Statei × Postt + β4 Foreigni × Postt
+β5 Cleani × Foreigni × Postt + Xθ + γt + εit
(4.7)
Table 21 shows the summary statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis.
4.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.4.1 Firm-level Analysis of the Polluting Industries
First, I report the results for the air-polluting industries at the firm level. In my previous
city-level analysis in Chapter 2, I have found that the output of polluting industries is more
in downwind cities closer to provincial borders after 2003. The possible mechanisms of
increasing polluting industries in those downwind cities include expansion of existing firms
and increasing new firms. Firm-level analysis can help us examine whether and how those
different channels have contributed to the increase of trans-boundary air pollution. This
analysis is a prelude for estimating the effects on clean industries, as those effects are also
through the two possible channels of changing the size of existing firms and affecting the
location choice of new firms.
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Table 22 reports the regression results for the output of existing firms in polluting in-
dustries, based on the econometric specification of Equation (4.1). Since the years 2000 and
2003 were the time of major policy changes, the interaction terms between Downwind and
year dummies Post2000 and Post2003 are the key explanatory variables. Column (1) is
for the subsample of all air-polluting industries. Downwind× Post2000 is positive but not
statistically significant, and Downwind× Post2003 is significantly positive. After 2003, the
average output of existing firms in air-polluting industries has been higher by 5.748 million
RMB (approximately 0.868 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities. Column (2) is for the
subsample of polluting industries of pollutant SO2. Downwind × Post2000 is positive but
not statistically significant, and Downwind×Post2003 is significantly positive. After 2003,
the average output of existing firms in polluting industries of SO2 has been higher by 7.230
million RMB (approximately 1.092 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities. Column (3) is for
the subsample of polluting industries of pollutant NO2. Downwind× Post2000 is negative
but not statistically significant, and Downwind × Post2003 is significantly positive. After
2003, the average output of existing firms in polluting industries of NO2 has been higher by
6.120 million RMB (approximately 0.925 million U.S. dollars) in downwind cities. Column
(4) is for the subsample of polluting industries of pollutant Soot. Downwind × Post2000
is positive but not statistically significant, and Downwind × Post2003 is significantly pos-
itive. After 2003, the average output of existing firms in polluting industries of Soot has
been higher by 5.586 million RMB (approximately 0.844 million U.S. dollars) in downwind
cities. The above results conclude that existing firms of air-polluting industries in downwind
cities have more output after the policy- change, which has contributed to the increase of
trans-boundary air pollution after 2003.
Table 23 reports the effects of state ownership on polluting industries. State-owned
enterprises are more likely to be influenced by government, and one hypothesis to test is that
the effects of policy-induced trans-boundary pollution are larger for state-owned enterprises.
I include the interaction terms State×Postt and Downwind×State×Postt in the regressions
to test this hypothesis by a DDD estimation. When these interaction terms are included,
the estimated coefficients of Downwind× Post2000 and Downwind× Post2003 are nearly
the same as in Table 22. Downwind×Post2003 is still significantly positive. The results of
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increasing trans-boundary air pollution after policy-change are robust. For all four columns,
the DDD estimator Downwind× State× Post2003 is positive but not significant.
Table 24 further includes variable indicating whether a firm is foreign-invested. When
these interaction terms are included, the estimated coefficients of Downwind × Post2000
and Downwind × Post2003 are nearly the same as in Table 22. Downwind × Post2003
is still significantly positive. The results of increasing trans-boundary air pollution after
policy-change are robust. The DDD interaction term Downwind × Foreign × Post2003
is negative and not significant for all four columns, and the combined marginal effects for
foreign-invested firms are not significant.
Table 25 reports the estimation results for the location choice of new firms in polluting
industries, based on the econometric specification of Equation (4.2). The sample is all
new firms starting after 1998. In all four columns, Polluting × Post2003 is significantly
positive, which implies that the probability of new firms in clean industries to be located
in downwind cities is about 2.0% to 3.4% higher after 2003. When including variables
indicating state ownership, the interaction term Polluting×State×Post2003 is positive but
not significant. When including variables indicating foreign ownership, the interaction term
Polluting×State×Post2000 is positive but not significant, and Polluting×State×Post2003
is negative but not significant.
4.4.2 Firm-level Analysis for the Clean Industries
Table 26 reports the estimation results for the outcomes of existing firms in clean indus-
tries, based on the econometric specification of Equation (4.3). The dependent variables of
Columns (1) and (2) are the output of clean industry firms, and which of Columns (3) and (4)
are the employment of clean industry firms. Receiver×Post2000 and Receiver×Post2003
are both significantly negative, which imply that trans-boundary air pollution has sig-
nificant negative effects on the output and employment of clean industries. In Column
(2), when control variables are included in regression, Receiver × Post2000 is -4.738 and
Receiver × Post2000 is -7.690. These results imply that the average output of an existing
clean industry firm in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution has decreased by 4.290
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million RMB (approximately 0.648 million U.S. dollars) after 2000 and has decreased by
7.690 million RMB (approximately 1.162 million U.S. dollars) after 2003. Since there are a
total of 3127 existing clean industry firms in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution,
the total negative effect on the annual output of existing firms of clean industries in receiv-
er cities is about 37.5 billion RMB (approximately 5.67 billion U.S. dollars). In Column
(4), when control variables are included in regression, Receiver × Post2000 is -37.31 and
Receiver × Post2000 is -15.26. These results imply that the average employment of an ex-
isting clean industry firm in receiver city has decreased by about 37 persons after 2000 and
has decreased by about 15 persons after 2003. The total negative effect on the employment
of existing firms of clean industries in receiver cities is about 164 thousand. Figure 17 shows
trends before and after policy-change in the two groups of cities. Since the economic reforms
began in the late 1970s, labor mobility within province has been less restricted in China.
Labor mobility for urban population across cities apply within each province. Therefore, my
empirical findings are consistent with the prediction of the model in Section 3.4 that distor-
tion caused by trans-boundary pollution is greater when labor markets are connected. The
estimated negative effects of trans-boundary pollution on clean industries are not only from
the negative productivity externalities, but also from the labor competition effects that labor
is leaving from the clean industries in the upwind cities receiving trans-boundary pollution.
Table 27 reports the estimation results for the outcomes of existing firms in clean industry
firms when there are more control variables Sender × Post2000 and Sender × Post2003.
Like in Table 26, the dependent variables of Columns (1) and (2) are the output of a clean
industry firm, while which of Columns (3) and (4) are the employment of a clean industry
firm. The estimation results are very similar as in Table 26: Receiver × Post2000 and
Receiver × Post2003 are both significantly negative, which imply that trans-boundary air
pollution has significant negative effects on the output and employment of clean industries.
In Column (2), Receiver × Post2000 is -4.009 and Receiver × Post2000 is -7.928. These
results imply that the average output of an existing clean industry firm in receiver cities
has decreased by 4.009 million RMB (approximately 0.606 million U.S. dollars) after 2000
and has decreased by 7.928 million RMB (approximately 1.198 million U.S. dollars) after
2003. Since there are a total of 3127 existing firms of clean industries in those cities, the
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total negative effect on the annual output of existing firms of clean industries in receiver
cities is about 37.3 billion RMB (approximately 5.64 billion U.S. dollars). The negative
effects of trans-boundary air pollution on the output of clean industries are robust as being
found in Table 7. In Column (4), Receiver×Post2000 is -38.10 and Receiver×Post2000 is
-15.43. These results imply that the average employment of an existing clean industry firm
in receiver city has decreased by about 38 persons after 2000 and has decreased by about 15
persons after 2003. The total negative effect on the employment of existing firms of clean
industries in receiver cities is about 167 thousand. The negative effects of trans-boundary
air pollution on employment of clean industries are also robust.
Table 28 reports the results for DDD estimations using average wind speed, based on
the econometric specification of Equation (4.4). Like in Table 26, dependent variables of
Columns (1) and (2) are the output of a clean industry firm, while which of Columns (3)
and (4) are the employment of a clean industry firm. Column (2) is the regression for output
with all control variables. The DDD interaction term Receiver ×Wind Speed × Post2003
is significantly negative (-1.319), and the interaction term Receiver × Post2003 is positive
(6.552) but not statistically significant. This implies that the negative effects of trans-
boundary air pollution are stronger in receiver cities with higher average wind speed. I also
calculate the estimated marginal effects of Receiver at different percentiles of WindSpeed,
which shows that the effect at the 90th percentile of Wind Speed (15.5 km/h) is -13.90,
and the effect at the 25th percentile of Wind Speed (10.3 km/h) is -7.04. Column (4)
is the regression for employment with all control variables. The DDD interaction term
Receiver ×Wind Speed × Post2003 is significantly negative (-6.396), and the interaction
term Receiver × Post2003 is significantly positive (58.74). The estimated marginal effects
of Receiver at different percentiles of Wind Speed are negative. The effect at the 90th
percentile of Wind Speed (15.5 km/h) is -40.40, and the effect at the 25th percentile of
Wind Speed (10.3 km/h) is -7.14. Negative effects are larger in cities with higher average
wind speed.
Table 29 reports the results for regressions including state and foreign ownership, based
on the econometric specification of Equation (4.5). Columns (1) and (2) have the output
of existing firms in clean industries as the dependent variable, and Columns (3) and (4)
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have the employment of existing firms in clean industries as the dependent variable. In
Column (1), when dummy variables indicating state ownership are included in the regression,
Receiver × Post2000 is still negative but not significant, and Receiver × Post2003 is still
significantly negative (-5.025). The DDD estimator Receiver × State × Post2003 is not
significant, which implies that the negative effects on state-owned firms are not significantly
different from other firms. In Column (2), when dummy variables indicating foreign-invested
firms are also included, Receiver × State × Post2003 is negative but still not statistically
significant. Meanwhile, Receiver × Foreign × Post2003 is significantly negative (-33.37),
which implies that the negative effects on foreign-invested firms are stronger than on other
firms. When comparing with the estimation results for employment in Columns (3) and (4),
we can find that employment of existing state-owned clean industry firms is significantly more
than other existing clean industry firms in receiver cities after 2003, while the negative effects
on output of existing state-owned clean industry firms are not significantly different from
other firms. These results suggest that state-owned clean industry firms under control or
influences of provincial governments have increased their employment after the policy change
when their productivity is negatively affected by trans-boundary pollution. The state-owned
firms of clean industries in the receiver cities hire more unproductive workers after policy
change, which is a distortion that reduces the efficiency of the economy. For the foreign-
invested clean industry firms, they are freer to adjust their decisions, so both output and
employment have decreased after receiving more trans-boundary air pollution. The combined
marginal effects of interaction terms Receiver×Post2003 and Receiver×Foreign×Post2003
is a reduction of 36.19 million RMB (approximately 5.468 million U.S. dollars) for the output
of an existing foreign-invested firm of clean industries in cities receiving trans-boundary air
pollution.
Table 30 reports the estimation results for the location choice of new firms in clean
industries, based on the econometric specification of Equations (4.6) and (4.7). In all four
columns, Clean×Post2003 is significantly negative, which implies that the probability of new
firms in clean industries to be located in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution is about
1.4% to 1.9% lower after 2003. When including variables indicating state ownership, the
interaction term Clean × State × Post2000” has a large and significantly negative coefficient
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(around -0.07) in Columns (3) and (4). However, Clean × Post2000 and Clean × Post2003
in Columns (3) and (4) are not very different from the regressions in Columns (1) and
(2) without the triple-differences interaction term of state ownership. Since decisions for
setting up new state-owned firms are made by local governments themselves and their actions
are earlier than private and foreign firms, the negative effect for state-owned new firms is
significant after 2000. Meanwhile, there were 69,896 new firms being setup during the period
1998 to 2007, and 2,094 of which were state-owned new firms. The number of state-owned
new firms was only 3% of the total number of new firms. When economic reforms toward
market economy took place in China in the 1990s and 2000s, there was a rule of “grasping the
large and letting the small go” to downsize the state sector. Therefore, state-owned firms did
not possess a large share in the new firms during that period, and the large and significantly
negative coefficient of the triple-differences interaction term Clean × State × Post2000 does
not affect the coefficients of Clean × Post2000 and Clean × Post2003. When including
variables indicating foreign ownership, the interaction term Clean× State× Post2000 and
Clean× State× Post2003 are neither significant.
4.4.3 City-level Analysis for the Clean Industries
In order to estimate the aggregate negative effects on clean industries, I also perform re-
gressions at the city level. Table 31 reports the estimation results for regressions with the
interaction terms Receiver × Postt. The dependent variable of Column (1) is the total em-
ployment of firms in clean industries without polluting the air, and which of Column (2) is
the total employment of firms in clean industries without polluting air or water. The esti-
mated coefficient of Receiver × Post2000 are not statistically significant for either column,
but Receiver×Post2003 are both significantly negative. These results imply that total em-
ployment of firms in clean industries without polluting air is relatively lower by about 26.65
thousand in an average receiver city after the policy change, and total employment of firms
in clean industries without polluting air or water is relatively lower by about 16.79 thousand
in an average receiver city after the policy-change. The dependent variable of Column (3)
is the number of firms in clean industries without polluting air, and which of Column (4)
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is the number of firms in clean industries without polluting air or water. The estimated
coefficient of Receiver × Post2000 are not statistically significant for either column, but
Receiver × Post2003 are both significantly negative. These results imply that the number
of firms in clean industries without polluting air is relatively lower by about 161 in an av-
erage receiver city after the policy change, and the total number of firms in clean industries
without polluting air or water is relatively lower by about 85 in an average receiver city after
the policy change. Figure 18 shows trends before and after policy-change in the two groups
of cities.
Table 32 reports the estimation results for regressions further including the interaction
term Sender×Postt. The same as in Table 31, the dependent variable of Column (1) is the
total employment of firms in clean industries without polluting the air, and which of Column
(2) is the total employment of firms in clean industries without polluting air or water. The
estimated coefficient of Receiver×Post2000 are not statistically significant for either column,
but Receiver × Post2003 are both significantly negative and very similar to the results in
Table 31. These results imply that total employment of firms in clean industries without
polluting air is relatively lower by about 26.44 thousand in an average receiver city after the
policy change, and total employment of firms in clean industries without polluting air or
water is relatively lower by about 16.67 thousand in an average receiver city after the policy
change. The dependent variable of Column (3) is the number of firms in clean industries
without polluting air, and which of Column (4) is the number of firms in clean industries
without polluting air or water. The estimated coefficient of Receiver × Post2000 are not
statistically significant for either column, but Receiver × Post2003 are both significantly
negative. These results imply that the number of firms in clean industries without polluting
air is relatively lower by about 159 in an average receiver city after the policy-change, and
the total number of firms in clean industries without polluting air or water is relatively lower
by about 85 in an average receiver city after the policy change.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
China’s inability to control pollution in an effective way stems in part from its decentralized
regulatory structure. Trans-boundary pollution is one of the major potential disadvantages
of decentralized environmental management. In this chapter, I figure out which cities are
most likely to receive trans-boundary air pollution from their upwind adjacent provinces.
Through a quasi-experimental approach combining large-scale policy-change and regional
wind patterns, my findings provide convincing evidence for the negative effects of policy-
induced trans-boundary air pollution on clean industries. The DID estimations show that
trans-boundary air pollution under China’s regionally decentralized environmental manage-
ment has significantly negative effects on non-polluting industries in cities near provincial
borders. The output and employment of existing firms in clean industries are relatively less
in cities receiving trans-boundary air pollution from neighboring provinces after 2003. For
all existing firms in the receiver cities, the total negative effect on output is about 37.3 billion
RMB (approximately 5.64 billion U.S. dollars). The negative effects are relatively larger for
clean industries in cities with higher average wind speed. State-owned firms of the clean
industries in the receiver cities have more unproductive employment. New firms in clean
industries are less likely to be located in the receiver cities. The probability of new firms in
clean industries to be located in receiver cities is about 1.4% to 1.9% lower after 2003.
The quasi-experimental approach based on large-scale policy-change and regional wind
pattern provide convincing evidence for the adverse effects of trans-boundary air pollution
on output and employment of clean industries. These findings contribute to the litera-
ture about estimating the negative effects of environmental pollution on industrial output.
The negative effects of policy-induced trans-boundary air pollution on output and location
choice of clean industries are unintended consequences of environmental regulation in Chi-
na. When clean industries are leaving cities receiving more trans-boundary air pollution, it
reduces economic opportunities in those cities and thus increases inequality across regions.
The negative consequences of trans-boundary air pollution greatly reduce the efficiency of
decentralized environmental management, and reforms in the environmental management
system are necessary to mitigate air pollution in China effectively.
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Figure 16: Receiver Cities in Henan Province
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Figure 17: Trends of Output and Employment of Clean Industries
Figure 18: Trends of Employment and Number of Firms of Clean Industries
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Table 21: Summary Statistics (City and Firm Level)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Firm-level variables
Firms in polluting industries:
Output Polluting (unit: 1 million RMB) 208,651 57.379 102.643 0.001 1148.078
Output SO2 (unit: 1 million RMB) 148,209 59.157 107.239 0.001 1145.889
Output NO2 (unit: 1 million RMB) 139,204 57.541 105.324 0.001 1145.889
Output Soot (unit: 1 million RMB) 187,449 56.119 100.178 0.001 1148.078
Firms in non-polluting industries:
Ouput Clean (unit: 1 million RMB) 286,434 62.774 143.274 0.001 2489.780
Employment Clean (unit: person) 284,630 332.472 609.507 1.000 25733
City-level variables
Average wind speed:
Wind Speed (unit: km/h)
2860 11.139 3.387 3.500 21.100
Population size:
Population (unit: 10,000 persons)
2698 119.432 146.124 14.080 1526.020
Total output of industrial firms:
Industrial Output (unit: 1 billion RMB)
2727 62.828 137.742 0.002 2225.147
Population density:
Population Density (unit: 10,000 /km2)
2672 0.097 0.052 0.001 1.094
GDP per capita:
GDP (unit: 10,000 RMB)
2691 2.001 2.043 0.184 32.025
Percentage of secondary industry in GDP:
Secondary Industry
2726 49.578 12.946 8.050 92.300
Percentage of tertiary industry in GDP:
Tertiary Industry
2726 41.046 10.259 7.300 81.000
Total number of above-scale firms:
Firm number
2691 765.155 1306.484 1.000 15520
Percentage of government expenditure in GDP:
Government Expenditure
2676 11.175 9.443 0.000 195.922
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Table 21 (continued).
Percentage of FDI in GDP:
FDI
2860 3.435 5.296 0.000 134.592
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Table 22: The Effects on Dirty Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Polluting Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot
Downwind × Post2000 -0.221 0.162 -0.225 -0.680
(0.701) (0.825) (0.816) (0.699)
Downwind × Post2003 5.748*** 7.230*** 6.120*** 5.586***
(1.355) (1.700) (1.682) (1.368)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 171,973 122,649 115,274 154,745
R-squared 0.135 0.147 0.142 0.136
Number of firms 28,192 19,858 18,704 25,364
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the
5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at firm level. (4) Other control
variables include city characteristics.
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Table 23: The Effects of State Ownership on Dirty Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Polluting Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot
Downwind × Post2000 0.445 1.067 1.005 -0.0862
(0.942) (1.161) (1.171) (0.952)
State × Post2000 -3.992*** -5.083*** -4.243*** -3.499***
(1.007) (1.247) (1.157) (1.000)
Downwind × State × Post2000 -1.522 -1.697 -2.863 -1.236
(1.996) (2.531) (2.508) (1.951)
Downwind × Post2003 4.827*** 5.871*** 4.564*** 4.672***
(1.421) (1.770) (1.719) (1.414)
State × Post2003 7.393*** 12.01*** 13.44*** 9.709***
(2.030) (2.472) (2.518) (2.037)
Downwind × State × Post2003 3.039 3.598 4.030 2.748
(3.703) (4.477) (4.474) (3.762)
Est. Marginal Effect:
Downwind × Post2003 + Downwind × State × Post2003 7.865** 9.469** 8.594** 7.420**
(3.458) (4.165) (4.184) (3.525)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 171,973 122,649 115,274 154,745
R-squared 0.135 0.148 0.145 0.137
Number of firms 28,192 19,858 18,704 25,364
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard
errors are clustered at firm level. (4) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 24: The Effects of State and Foreign Ownership on Dirty Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Polluting Output SO2 Output NO2 Output Soot
Downwind × Post2000 0.319 0.763 0.738 -0.0719
(0.944) (1.158) (1.166) (0.961)
State × Post2000 -4.070*** -5.349*** -4.514*** -3.532***
(1.008) (1.250) (1.160) (1.001)
Downwind × State × Post2000 -1.369 -1.393 -2.561 -1.157
(1.999) (2.534) (2.511) (1.953)
Foreign × Post2000 7.409* 1.318 1.521 9.411**
(3.785) (5.333) (5.462) (3.972)
Downwind × Foreign × Post2000 12.24 21.34 16.32 3.808
(9.682) (15.01) (15.55) (9.342)
Downwind × Post2003 5.051*** 6.130*** 4.899*** 4.978***
(1.429) (1.773) (1.720) (1.421)
State × Post2003 7.981*** 12.78*** 14.24*** 10.28***
(2.032) (2.473) (2.519) (2.038)
Downwind × State × Post2003 2.717 3.201 3.554 2.349
(3.705) (4.477) (4.472) (3.764)
Foreign × Post2003 15.08*** 26.46*** 26.58*** 14.08***
(4.299) (6.298) (6.402) (4.300)
Downwind × Foreign × Post2003 -5.479 -10.00 -9.405 -6.925
(10.19) (16.35) (16.72) (10.97)
Est. Marginal Effect:
Downwind × Post2003 + Downwind × State × Post2003 7.768** 9.332** 8.453** 7.327**
(3.459) (4.165) (4.184) (3.525)
Downwind × Post2003 + Downwind × Foreign × Post2003 -0.428 -3.871 -4.505 -1.947
(10.09) (16.25) (16.63) (10.88)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 24 (continued).
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 171,973 122,649 115,274 154,745
R-squared 0.135 0.147 0.142 0.136
Number of firms 28,192 19,858 18,704 25,364
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (3) Standard
errors are clustered at firm level. (4) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 25: The Effects of State and Foreign Ownership on Dirty Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Prob(Downwind) Prob(Downwind) Prob(Downwind) Prob(Downwind)
Polluting × Post2000 0.00551 -0.00279 -0.00204 -0.000992
(0.00829) (0.00799) (0.00820) (0.00830)
State × Post2000 0.0155 0.0162
(0.0253) (0.0253)
Polluting × State × Post2000 -0.0173 -0.0181
(0.0366) (0.0366)
Foreign × Post2000 0.00963
(0.0264)
Polluting × Foreign × Post2000 -0.0332
(0.0570)
Polluting × Post2003 0.0344*** 0.0208** 0.0200** 0.0197**
(0.00904) (0.00877) (0.00897) (0.00909)
State × Post2003 -0.00731 -0.00894
(0.0347) (0.0348)
Polluting × State × Post2003 0.0235 0.0236
(0.0510) (0.0510)
Foreign × Post2003 -0.0354
(0.0281)
Polluting × Foreign × Post2003 -0.0232
(0.0610)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,896 65,570 65,570 65,570
R-squared 0.161 0.200 0.200 0.200
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(3) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 26: The Effects on Clean Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Clean Output Clean Employment Clean Employment Clean
Receiver × Post2000 -4.738*** -4.290*** -35.67*** -37.31***
(1.047) (1.051) (10.76) (10.73)
Receiver × Post2003 -9.232*** -7.690*** -20.49*** -15.26**
(1.795) (1.780) (6.656) (6.594)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes No Yes
Observations 241,961 238,576 241,959 238,574
R-squared 0.080 0.078 0.005 0.007
Number of firms 38,241 38,241 38,241 38,241
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at firm level. (4) Other control variables include city
characteristics.
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Table 27: The Effects on Clean Industries (Existing Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Clean Output Clean Employment Clean Employment Clean
Receiver × Post2000 -4.437*** -4.009*** -36.41*** -38.10***
(1.056) (1.060) (10.89) (10.85)
Receiver × Post2003 -9.477*** -7.928*** -20.24*** -15.43**
(1.802) (1.787) (6.713) (6.646)
Sender × Post2000 -2.049** -1.780* 5.139 5.771
(0.958) (0.948) (5.902) (5.896)
Sender × Post2003 2.366 2.691 -2.066 3.447
(1.787) (1.737) (6.127) (6.198)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes No Yes
Observations 241,961 238,576 241,959 238,574
R-squared 0.080 0.078 0.005 0.007
Number of firms 38,241 38,241 38,241 38,241
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at firm level. (4) Other control variables include city
characteristics.
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Table 28: Triple-differences Estimation with Wind Speed (Clean Industry)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Clean Output Clean Employment Clean Employment Clean
Receiver × Wind Speed × Post2000 -0.935*** -1.367*** -5.698** -5.778***
(0.360) (0.371) (2.238) (2.205)
Receiver × Post2000 5.523 11.10*** 29.48 28.05
(4.084) (4.221) (23.93) (23.80)
Wind Speed × Post2000 -0.0323 0.0506 2.523*** 2.715***
(0.121) (0.123) (0.656) (0.660)
Receiver × Wind Speed × Post2003 -1.277** -1.319** -5.107* -6.396**
(0.613) (0.616) (2.647) (2.629)
Receiver × Post2003 4.667 6.552 37.25 58.74**
(7.192) (7.236) (27.80) (27.68)
Wind Speed × Post2003 -0.165 -0.0245 3.084*** 4.494***
(0.217) (0.212) (0.723) (0.681)
Est. Marginal effect of Downwind at:
90th Pctile of Wind Speed (15.5) -15.12*** -13.90*** -41.91*** -40.40***
(3.11) (3.10) (15.35) (15.18)
75th Pctile of Wind Speed (11.8) -10.40*** -9.02*** -23.01*** -16.73**
(1.81) (1.80) (7.60) (7.52)
50th Pctile of Wind Speed (11.2) -9.63*** -8.23*** -19.95*** -12.89*
(1.79) (1.79) (6.86) (6.80)
25th Pctile of Wind Speed (10.3) -8.48*** -7.04*** -15.35** -7.14
(1.90) (1.91) (6.36) (6.32)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes No Yes
Observations 241,961 238,576 241,959 238,574
R-squared 0.080 0.079 0.005 0.008
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Table 28 (continued).
Number of cities 38,241 38,241 38,241 38,241
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(3) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 29: The Effects of State and Foreign Ownership on Clean Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Output Clean Output Clean Employment Clean Employment Clean
Receiver × Post2000 -3.572 -3.326 -37.95*** -39.86***
(2.209) (2.239) (13.54) (13.61)
State × Post2000 -3.103*** -3.629*** 2.691 -1.117
(1.128) (1.139) (4.617) (4.620)
Receiver × State × Post2000 0.495 1.003 1.526 6.192
(4.472) (4.485) (15.96) (15.92)
Foreign × Post2000 5.539* 16.29
(3.366) (10.68)
Receiver × Foreign × Post2000 -12.57 -45.17
(13.17) (37.89)
Receiver × Post2003 -5.025** -2.822 -18.94** -10.71
(2.352) (2.388) (7.653) (7.620)
State × Post2003 -18.38*** -16.04*** -103.3*** -90.84***
(1.428) (1.428) (5.613) (5.524)
Receiver × State × Post2003 0.0567 -2.540 50.39*** 40.55***
(2.917) (2.943) (13.67) (13.67)
Foreign × Post2003 26.15*** 75.69***
(3.456) (10.51)
Receiver × Foreign × Post2003 -33.37*** -12.96
(10.02) (51.00)
Est. Marginal Effect:
Receiver × Post2003 +
Receiver × State × Post2003 -4.968*** -5.362*** 31.45*** 29.84**
(1.862) (1.861) (11.90) (11.93)
Receiver × Post2003 +
Receiver × Foreign × Post2003 -36.19*** -23.68
(9.81) (50.40)
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Table 29 (continued).
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 238,576 238,576 241,959 238,574
R-squared 0.080 0.083 0.009 0.013
Number of firms 38,241 38,241 38,241 38,241
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level. (3) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 30: Location Choice of New Firms (Clean Industries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Prob(Receiver) Prob(Receiver) Prob(Receiver) Prob(Receiver)
Clean × Post2000 0.00114 0.00270 0.00564 0.00577
(0.00689) (0.00680) (0.00693) (0.00708)
State × Post2000 0.0248 0.0247
(0.0175) (0.0175)
Clean × State × Post2000 -0.0747** -0.0751**
(0.0355) (0.0355)
Foreign × Post2000 -0.0175
(0.0317)
Clean × Foreign × Post2000 0.00506
(0.0402)
Clean × Post2003 -0.0189** -0.0138* -0.0168** -0.0170**
(0.00752) (0.00747) (0.00760) (0.00777)
State × Post2003 -0.0221 -0.0226
(0.0244) (0.0244)
Clean × State × Post2003 0.0763 0.0765
(0.0488) (0.0488)
Foreign × Post2003 -0.0102
(0.0335)
Clean × Foreign × Post2003 0.00903
(0.0427)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,896 65,570 65,570 65,570
R-squared 0.183 0.197 0.197 0.197
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at
the 10% level. (3) Other control variables include city characteristics.
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Table 31: The Effects on Clean Industries (City-level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Employment Clean1 Employment Clean2 Firm Clean1 Firm Clean2
Receiver × Post2000 -0.247 -0.275 -14.42 -6.831
(1.042) (0.689) (37.18) (21.91)
Receiver × Post2003 -2.665** -1.679** -160.5** -85.27***
(1.104) (0.682) (61.84) (30.66)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648
R-squared 0.501 0.564 0.386 0.430
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at city level. (4) Other control variables include city
characteristics.
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Table 32: The Effects on Clean Industries (City-level, with More Control Variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Employment Clean1 Employment Clean2 Firm Clean1 Firm Clean2
Receiver × Post2000 -0.323 -0.331 -13.80 -6.320
(1.068) (0.710) (37.59) (22.19)
Receiver × Post2003 -2.644** -1.666** -158.6** -84.62***
(1.096) (0.684) (61.25) (30.51)
Sender × Post2000 0.940 0.680 -1.421 -3.887
(0.939) (0.730) (20.30) (12.85)
Sender × Post2003 -0.324 -0.178 -41.53 -14.94
(1.107) (0.881) (38.03) (23.89)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648
R-squared 0.501 0.565 0.386 0.430
Number of cities 286 286 286 286
Notes: (1) Standard error in parentheses. (2) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors are clustered at city level. (4) Other control variables include city
characteristics.
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APPENDIX A
SOLVING THE MODEL WITH SEPARATED LABOR MARKETS
A.1 PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND COST FUNCTION
I assume production functions to be constant return to scale. The production function for
“dirty” industry in city i is
qdi = L
d
i
The cost minimization problem is
minwdiL
d
i
s.t. Ldi = q
d
i
Therefore, the cost function for “dirty” industry in city i is
cd(qdi ) = w
d
i q
d
i
The production function for “clean” industry in city i is
qci =
Lci
γP−i + 1
where P−i is the negative externality of pollution from upwind city −i, and γ ≥ 0.
The cost minimization problem is
minwciL
c
i
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s.t.
Lci
γP−i + 1
= qci
Therefore, the cost function for “clean” industry in city i is
cc(qci ) = w
c
i (γP−i + 1)q
c
i
A.2 TRANS-BOUNDARY POLLUTION
I assume that pollution can only affect the next city in downwind direction, so productivity
in city down is affected by pollution in city up (Pup), and productivity in city up is affected
by pollution in city down of the upwind province (Pdown(−i)).
For simplicity, I assume that negative effect of pollution is a function of output in dirty
industry:
Pdown(−i) = qddown(−i)
Pup = q
d
up
Therefore, the cost functions for “clean” industry in cities up and down are:
cc(qcup) = w
c
up(γq
d
down(−i) + 1)q
c
up
cc(qcdown) = w
c
down(γq
d
up + 1)q
c
down
A.3 CASE 1: NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES (γ > 0), BUT
NO REGULATORY PRESSURE (φ = 0)
In this setting, there is negative effects of pollution on productivity (γ > 0):
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
+pdqddown − (qddown)2 + pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2
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Let the objective function be
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
+pdqddown − (qddown)2 + pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2
A.3.1 Case 1: Solution
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2qdup − 2γ2(qcdown)2qdup − 2γ(qcdown)2 = 0 (A.1)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqddown(−i) + 1)2qcup = 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂qddown
= 0⇒ pd − 2qddown = 0 (A.3)
∂L
∂qcdown
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown = 0 (A.4)
From Equation (A.2):
qc∗up =
pc
2(γqddown(−i) + 1)
2
From Equation (A.3):
qd∗down =
pd
2
Equations (A.1) and (A.4) will solve optimal qd∗up and q
c∗
down. From Equation (A.4) I get:
qcdown =
pc
2(γqdup + 1)
2
(A.5)
From Equation (A.1) I get:
qcdown =
√
pd − 2qdup
2γ2qdup + 2γ
(A.6)
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A.3.2 Case 1: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
The symmetric pattern of the model implies that the Nash equilibrium of trans-boundary
pollution will satisfy:
qddown(−i) = q
d
down
Therefore, equilibrium qd∗down and q
c∗
up are
qd∗down =
pd
2
qc∗up =
pc
2(γqddown(−i) + 1)
2
=
pc
2(γp
d
2
+ 1)2
Equilibrium qc∗down and q
d∗
up are solved by Equations (A.5) and (A.6).
A.3.3 Case 1: Social Planner’s Solution
Here is the social planner’s problem of this case. There is qddown(−i) = q
d
down in the objective
function of a social planner, which is different from the objective function of competitive
provincial governments.
L = pdqdup−(qdup)2+pcqcup−(γqddown+1)2(qcup)2+pdqddown−(qddown)2+pcqcdown−(γqdup+1)2(qcdown)2
Since the spatial structure is totally symmetric, there will be no difference between cities
up and down for the social planner. Therefore, we have the following conditions:
qdup = q
d
down
qcup = q
c
down
Using these conditions, the social planner’s problem becomes
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqdup + 1)2(qcup)2
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2qdup − 2γ2(qcup)2qdup − 2γ(qcup)2 = 0 (A.7)
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∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcup = 0 (A.8)
This is a two-equation system that solves the social planner’s solutions.
From Equation (A.7):
qcup =
√
pd − 2qdup
2γ2qdup + 2γ
From Equation (A.8):
qcup =
pc
2(γqdup + 1)
2
A.4 CASE 2: NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES (γ > 0), AND
POSITIVE REGULATORY PRESSURES (φ > 0)
In this setting, central government includes environmental pollution when evaluating perfor-
mances of provincial leaders (φ > 0). The promotion of provincial leaders depends on both
economic growth (aggregate surplus) and environmental pollution.
Therefore, the decision problem becomes:
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
−φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
Let the objective function be
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
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A.4.1 Case 2: Solution
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2qdup − 2γ2(qcdown)2qdup − 2γ(qcdown)2 − φγ = 0 (A.9)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqddown(−i) + 1)2qcup = 0 (A.10)
∂L
∂qddown
= 0⇒ pd − 2qddown = 0 (A.11)
∂L
∂qcdown
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown = 0 (A.12)
From Equation (A.10):
qc∗up =
pc
2(γqddown(−i) + 1)
2
From Equation (A.11):
qd∗down =
pd
2
Equations (A.9) and (A.12) will solve optimal qd∗up and q
c∗
down. From Equation (A.12) I
get:
qcdown =
pc
2(γqdup + 1)
2
(A.13)
From Equation (A.9) I get:
qcdown =
√
pd − 2qdup − φγ
2γ2qdup + 2γ
(A.14)
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A.4.2 Case 2: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
The symmetric pattern of the model implies that the Nash equilibrium of trans-boundary
pollution will satisfy:
qddown(−i) = q
d
down
Therefore, equilibrium qd∗down and q
c∗
up are
qd∗down =
pd
2
qc∗up =
pc
2(γqddown(−i) + 1)
2
=
pc
2(γp
d
2
+ 1)2
Equilibrium qc∗down and q
d∗
up are solved by Equations (A.13) and (A.14).
A.4.3 Case 2: Social Planner’s Solution
Here is the social planner’s problem of this case. There is qddown(−i) = q
d
down in the objective
function of a social planner, which is different from the objective function of competitive
provincial governments.
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − φ(γqddown + γqdup)
Since we have the following conditions for a social planner:
qdup = q
d
down
qcup = q
c
down
Using these conditions, the social planner’s problem becomes
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqdup + 1)2(qcup)2 − φγqdup
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2qdup − 2γ2(qcup)2qdup − 2γ(qcup)2 − φγ = 0 (A.15)
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∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcup = 0 (A.16)
This is a two-equation system that solves the social planner’s solutions.
From Equation (A.15):
qcup =
√
pd − 2qdup − φγ
2γ2qdup + 2γ
From Equation (A.16):
qcup =
pc
2(γqdup + 1)
2
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APPENDIX B
SOLVING THE MODEL THAT LABOR MARKETS ARE CONNECTED
WITHIN EACH INDUSTRY
In the second model, I assume that labor markets are connected within each industry in
each province. There are now two labor markets: industry “dirty” and “clean”. Wage is
increasing in total labor demand in each labor market.
B.1 CASE 1: NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES (γ > 0), BUT
NO REGULATORY PRESSURE (φ = 0)
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2
−αqddownqdup + pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
Let the objective function be
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2 − αqddownqdup
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − 2αqddownqdup − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
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B.1.1 Case 1: Solution
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd−2qdup−2γ(qcdown)2(γqdup+1)−2αqddown−2αγ(γqddown(−i)+1)qcupqcdown = 0 (B.1)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqddown(−i) + 1)2qcup − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcdown = 0 (B.2)
∂L
∂qddown
= 0⇒ pd − 2qddown − 2αqdup = 0 (B.3)
∂L
∂qcdown
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcup = 0 (B.4)
B.1.2 Case 1: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
The symmetric pattern of the model implies that the Nash equilibrium of trans-boundary
pollution will satisfy:
qddown(−i) = q
d
down
Hence Equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.4) will become:
pd − 2qdup − 2γ(qcdown)2(γqdup + 1)− 2αqddown − 2αγ(γqddown + 1)qcupqcdown = 0 (B.5)
pc − 2(γqddown + 1)2qcup − 2α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcdown = 0 (B.6)
pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown − 2α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcup = 0 (B.7)
The equilibrium solutions are solved by the system of Equations (B.3), (B.5), (B.6), and
(B.7).
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From Equation (B.3), I get
qddown =
pd − 2αqdup
2
From Equation (B.6), I get
qcdown =
pc − 2(γqddown + 1)2qcup
2α(γqddown + 1)(γq
d
up + 1)
=
pc − 2(γ(pd−2αqdup)
2
+ 1)2qcup
2α(
γ(pd−2αqdup)
2
+ 1)(γqdup + 1)
Substituting them into Equation (B.5) and (B.6), then it will become a 2-equation system
with 2 variables that will be used for numerical analysis of comparative statics.
B.1.3 Social Planner’s Solution
Here is the social planner’s problem of this case. There is qddown(−i) = q
d
down in the objective
function of a social planner.
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcdown
−(γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
Since the spatial structure is totally symmetric, there will be no difference between cities
up and down for the social planner. Therefore, we have the following conditions:
qdup = q
d
down
qcup = q
c
down
Using these conditions, the social planner’s problem becomes:
L = pdqdup − (1 + α)(qdup)2 + pcqcup − (1 + α)(γqdup + 1)2(qcup)2
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2(1 + α)qdup − 2(1 + α)γ(qcup)2(γqdup + 1) = 0 (B.8)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(1 + α)(γqdup + 1)2qcup = 0 (B.9)
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B.2 CASE 2: NEGATIVE PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES (γ > 0), AND
POSITIVE REGULATORY PRESSURE (φ > 0)
In this setting, central government includes environmental pollution when evaluating perfor-
mances of provincial leaders (φ > 0). The promotion of provincial leaders depends on both
economic growth (aggregate surplus) and environmental pollution.
Therefore, the decision problem becomes:
max pdqdup − cd(qdup) + pcqcup − cc(qcup) + pdqddown − cd(qddown) + pcqcdown − cc(qcdown)
−φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
= pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcdown
−(γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown − φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
Let the objective function be
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 + pcqcup − (γqddown(−i) + 1)2(qcup)2 + pdqddown − (qddown)2
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − 2αqddownqdup − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown
−φ(γqddown(−i) + γqdup)
B.2.1 Case 2: Solution
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd−2qdup−2γ(qcdown)2(γqdup+1)−2αqddown−2αγ(γqddown(−i) +1)qcupqcdown−φγ = 0
(B.10)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqddown(−i) + 1)2qcup − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcdown = 0 (B.11)
∂L
∂qddown
= 0⇒ pd − 2qddown − 2αqdup = 0 (B.12)
∂L
∂qcdown
= 0⇒ pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown − 2α(γqddown(−i) + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcup = 0 (B.13)
124
B.2.2 Case 2: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
The symmetric pattern of the model implies that the Nash equilibrium of trans-boundary
pollution will satisfy:
qddown(−i) = q
d
down
Hence Equations (B.10), (B.11) and (B.13) will become:
pd − 2qdup − 2γ(qcdown)2(γqdup + 1)− 2αqddown − 2αγ(γqddown + 1)qcupqcdown − φγ = 0 (B.14)
pc − 2(γqddown + 1)2qcup − 2α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcdown = 0 (B.15)
pc − 2(γqdup + 1)2qcdown − 2α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcup = 0 (B.16)
The equilibrium solutions are solved by the system of Equations (B.12), (B.14), (B.15),
and (B.16).
From Equation (B.12), I get
qddown =
pd − 2αqdup
2
From Equation (B.15), I get
qcdown =
pc − 2(γqddown + 1)2qcup
2α(γqddown + 1)(γq
d
up + 1)
=
pc − 2(γ(pd−2αqdup)
2
+ 1)2qcup
2α(
γ(pd−2αqdup)
2
+ 1)(γqdup + 1)
Substituting them into Equation (B.14) and (B.16), then it will become a 2-equation
system with 2 variables that will be used for numerical analysis of comparative statics.
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B.2.3 Social Planner’s Solution
Here is the social planner’s problem of this case. There is qddown(−i) = q
d
down in the objective
function of a social planner.
L = pdqdup − (qdup)2 − αqddownqdup + pcqcup − (γqddown + 1)2(qcup)2
−α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown + pdqddown − (qddown)2 − αqddownqdup
+pcqcdown − (γqdup + 1)2(qcdown)2 − α(γqddown + 1)(γqdup + 1)qcupqcdown − φ(γqddown + γqdup)
Since the spatial structure is totally symmetric, there will be no difference between cities
up and down for the social planner. Therefore, we have the following conditions:
qdup = q
d
down
qcup = q
c
down
Using these conditions, the social planner’s problem becomes:
L = pdqdup − (1 + α)(qdup)2 + pcqcup − (1 + α)(γqdup + 1)2(qcup)2 − φγqdup
First order conditions:
∂L
∂qdup
= 0⇒ pd − 2(1 + α)qdup − 2(1 + α)γ(qcup)2(γqdup + 1)− φγ = 0 (B.17)
∂L
∂qcup
= 0⇒ pc − 2(1 + α)(γqdup + 1)2qcup = 0 (B.18)
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